CoChat

PRAGMATIC INTERVENTIONS INTO ENACTIVE AND EXTENDED CONCEPTIONS OF COGNITION

Gallagher, Shaun · 2014 · Philosophical Issues
Cited by 63

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Clear statements of both extended and enactive conceptions of cognition can be found in John Dewey and other pragmatists. In this paper I'll argue that we can find resources in the pragmatists to address two ongoing debates: (1) in contrast to recent disagreements between proponents of extended vs enactive cognition, pragmatism supports a more integrative view—an enactive conception of extended cognition, and (2) pragmatist views suggest ways to answer the main objections raised against extended and enactive conceptions—specifically objections focused on constitution versus causal factors, and the mark of the mental.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/phis.12027

Cites

17 of 17 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 17 references

Cited by

See all 63

Metadata

Authors
Gallagher, S.
Venue
Philosophical Issues
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2014-09-23
Volume
24
Issue
1
Pages
110-126
ISSN
  • 1533-6077 (ISSN-L)
  • 1758-2237
OpenAlex
W1523194215
Cited by
63
References
17
FWCI
2.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: PRAGMATIC INTERVENTIONS INTO ENACTIVE AND EXTENDED CONCEPTIONS OF COGNITION. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/phis.12027
The paper
Gallagher, S. (2014). PRAGMATIC INTERVENTIONS INTO ENACTIVE AND EXTENDED CONCEPTIONS OF COGNITION. Philosophical Issues. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12027

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.