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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality
Open accessAbstract
In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first‐order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher‐order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying to resolve this tension and argue that the best way to do this is to reject the idea that strong evidential support is the stuff rationality is made of. In the course of doing this, I shall argue that there is a special class of propositions about the requirements of rationality that we cannot make rational mistakes about and explain how this can be.
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Wedgwood, R. (2002) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.10 · Cited by 279
Cited by
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
Worsnip, A. (2018) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12246 · Cited by 317
Weatherson, B. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001 · Cited by 302
Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law
Littlejohn, C. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1608-4 · Cited by 95
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Littlejohn, C.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-12-22
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 257-272
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W2237936735
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 41.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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