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Cited by 23Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmbodied and Extended CognitionEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Mirror self-recognition and self-identification

Open access
Boyle, Alexandria·2018·Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12370
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Abstract

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self‐aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self‐awareness in question is psychological or bodily self‐awareness. This paper argues that whilst self‐recognition does not require psychological self‐awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self‐awareness would leave something out. That is that self‐recognition requires ‘objective self‐awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self‐identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self‐awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self‐awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self‐representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.

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  • A more sophisticated grade of self-consciousness involves awareness of one's own body as a persisting object that exists in the world.

    “A more sophisticated grade of self-consciousness involves awareness of one’s own body as a persisting object that exists in the world [65].”

    From Dimensions of Animal Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as [65]

    Section 5 (Self-Identification; page not provided) describes the more sophisticated capacity to represent oneself as an object in the world. But it distinguishes that objective self-awareness from bodily self-awareness, and the passages do not say that the object is understood as persisting over time. (LLM, conf=0.85)

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. [1]1. Anderson, J. R. (1986). Mirror-mediated finding of hidden food by monkeys. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 100(3), 237-242.
  2. [5]5. Beer, C. (1997). Expressions of mind in animal behaviour. In R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thompson, & H. K. Miles (Eds.), Anthropomorphism, anecdote, and animals (pp. 198- 209). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
  3. [9]9. Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  4. [13]13. Gallup, G. G., Anderson, J. R., & Platek, S. J. (2011). Self-recognition. In S. Gallagher (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of The Self (pp. 80-110). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  5. [26]26. Mitchell, R. W. (2010). Understanding the body as spatial cognition. In F. L. Dolins & R. W. Mitchell (Eds.), Spatial perception, spatial cognition: Mapping the self and space (pp. 341- 364). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Authors
Boyle, A.
Affiliations
University of Cambridge (GB)
Corresponding author
Boyle, Alexandria
ORCID
Boyle, Alexandria
Venue
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2017-02-08
Volume
97
Issue
2
Pages
284-303
ISSN
  • 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
  • 1933-1592
DOI
10.1111/phpr.12370
OpenAlex
W2562510280
Cited by
23
References
41
Citations by year
2025: 14 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2
FWCI
1.42
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (publishedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
  • Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion)
  • Apollo
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
mirror self-recognition, self-awareness, body awareness, self-identification, misidentification, great apes, first-person thought, self-representation, theory of mind, mental time travel, cognitive sophistication

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