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Cited by 19Philosophical Ethics and TheoryClassical Philosophy and ThoughtEthics, Aesthetics, and Art

Natural goodness without natural history

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Moosavi, Parisa·2022·Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12751
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Abstract

Neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalism purports to show that moral evaluation of human action and character is an of evaluation of natural goodness—a kind of evaluation that applies to living things in virtue of their nature and based on their form of life. The standard neo‐Aristotelian view defines natural goodness by way of generic statements describing the natural history, or the ‘characteristic’ life, of a species. In this paper, I argue that this conception of natural goodness commits the neo‐Aristotelian view to a problematic anti‐individualism that results in the wrong assessment of individuals with uniquely adaptive adjustments. I then offer an alternative account of natural goodness that avoids this problem. Instead of relying on generic statements about a species, my account defines natural goodness based on counterfactual conditionals describing the modal properties of a single individual. I argue that this modal‐explanatory account gives a conception of natural goodness that is more intuitively plausible and better suited to capture the diversity and plasticity distinctive of life.

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  • Prominent advocates of Aristotelian naturalism maintain that whatever species a living being is has nothing to do with whatever species anyone thinks the living being is.

    “However, prominent advocates of Aristotelian naturalism maintain that whatever species a living being is has nothing to do with whatever species anyone thinks the living being is (Moosavi 2020, 2;Thompson 2008, 80).”

    From Can a MacIntyrian Care about Severely Disabled Strangers? (2022) · cites this paper as Moosavi 2020, 2

    The Introduction (§1; page unavailable) says neo-Aristotelians regard natural-goodness evaluations as independent of how humans happen to evaluate an organism. But it does not explicitly say that an organism’s species membership is independent of what anyone thinks its species is; that is a more specific claim. (LLM, conf=0.75)

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Authors
Moosavi, P.
Affiliations
York University (CA)
Corresponding author
Moosavi, Parisa
Venue
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2020-11-30
Volume
104
Issue
1
Pages
78-100
ISSN
  • 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
  • 1933-1592
DOI
10.1111/phpr.12751
OpenAlex
W3107534473
Cited by
19
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1
FWCI
6.44
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Classical Philosophy and Thought
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
Keywords
natural goodness, natural history, characteristic life, anti-individualism, counterfactuals, modal properties, individual differences, adaptive adjustment, moral evaluation of characters

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