Can a MacIntyrian Care about Severely Disabled Strangers?

Disabled people have poorer health and well-being than non-disabled people in large part because of social factors like isolation, prejudice, environmental barriers stemming from a lack of social support, and socially-reinforced negative attitudes towards themselves.

“Data from the European Social Survey conducted over 12 years and comprising 32 countries suggests that disabled people have poorer health and well-being than non-disabled people in large part because of social factors like isolation, prejudice, environmental barriers stemming from a lack of social support and socially-reinforced negative attitudes towards themselves (Branco, Ramos and Hewstone 201”

• cites Branco, Ramos and Hewstone 2019 sourcePartly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Relationships of giving and receiving will always instantiate flawed social relationships.

“Importantly, relationships of giving and receiving will always instantiate flawed social relationships.”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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MacIntyre's ability to explain obligations to severely disabled strangers is entailed by his discussion of responsibilities based on social identity and flawed social relationships.

“This is entailed by MacIntyre's discussion of responsibilities based on social identity and flawed social relationships-something discussed as early as After Virtue (AV) but often ignored.”

MacIntyre suggests at multiple instances that the relationships of giving and receiving include dependent reasoners-those who do not have practical reason or only have it to some minimal degree.

“MacIntyre suggests at multiple instances that the relationships of giving and receiving include dependent reasoners-those who do not have practical reason or only have it to some minimal degree.”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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Effectively opposing systemic injustice at the individual level requires opposing it at the global level.

“I argue that effectively opposing systemic injustice at the individual level requires opposing it at the global level.”

Those who profit from flawed social relationships owe those without whom their undeserved advantage would be impossible-the victims of the flawed social relationship.

“Particularly, they owe those without whom their undeserved advantage would be impossible-those who are the victims of the flawed social relationship.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The nature of flawed social relationships is not a brute fact.

MacIntyre's account entails that non-disabled people owe severely disabled strangers because of their social relationship to them.

“Thus, MacIntyre's account entails that non-disabled people owe severely disabled strangers because of their social relationship to them.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The nature of flawed social relationships is not a brute fact.

Whenever we use disability as a distorting measure, we are uncritically enabling a flawed social relationship.

“Whenever we use it as such, we are uncritically enabling a flawed social relationship.”

The answer to why severely disabled people are members of MacIntyre's communities is both social and biological.

“MacIntyre is vague on this point, but I suggest that the answer is both social and biological.”

Disabled people made up nearly half of all people killed by law enforcement.

“This review also indicated disabled people made up nearly half of all people killed by law enforcement (Mueller, Forber-Pratt and Sriken 2019, 712-20).”

• cites Mueller, Forber-Pratt and Sriken 2019 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The majority of Aristotelian naturalists base their accounts on an abstract, preempirical conception of the human life form.

“The majority of Aristotelian naturalists-theorists who tie ethics to an Aristotelian account of human nature-based their accounts on an abstract, preempirical conception of the human life form (ex. Thompson 2008).”

• cites Thompson 2008Not matched

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MacIntyre's account entails that non-disabled people have obligations to severely disabled strangers because of their social relationship to them.

“I suggest that MacIntyre's account entails that non-disabled people have obligations to severely disabled strangers because of their social relationship to them.”

MacIntyre does recognize severely disabled people as part of the communities foundational to his account.

“I first show that MacIntyre does recognize severely disabled people as part of the communities foundational to his account and make some suggestions as to why.”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Severely disabled people cannot participate in communities of practices.

Violence against disabled people was disproportionately perpetrated by people the disabled victim knew.

“Violence was disproportionately perpetrated by people the disabled victim knew.”

• cites Mueller, Forber-Pratt and Sriken 2019 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

NeoAristotelians largely still have difficulty explaining our moral responsibilities to those on the other side of the world.

“And despite the valuable work of Martha Nussbaum, neoAristotelians largely still have difficulty explaining our moral responsibilities to those on the other side of the world.”

• cites Martha NussbaumNot matched

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Recognition and rectification of this debt partly makes possible the achievement of individual and communal goods.

“It is the recognition and rectification of this debt that partly makes possible the achievement of individual and communal goods along lines I have already established.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The nature of flawed social relationships is not a brute fact.

For MacIntyre, when we owe others, we owe because of what we receive, have received, and continue to receive within the relationships of giving and receiving that are key to the pursuit of our individual and common goods.

“For MacIntyre when we owe others, we owe because of what we receive, have received and continue to receive within the relationships of giving and receiving that are key to the pursuit of our individual and common goods.”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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In cases where we are childhood victims of corrupted relationships of giving and receiving and have not received, if we eventually participate as independent practical reasoners, we owe very little, if at all.

“The nature of these relationships is why, in cases where we are the childhood victims of corrupted relationships of giving and receiving and have not received-as in the case of abuse, gross neglect, or systemic injustice-if we are eventually able to participate in the relationships of giving and receiving as independent practical reasoners, we owe very little, if at all.”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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Systematic flaws in social relationships are undeserved wrongs that generate obligations.

“Here, systematic flaws in social relationships are wrongs-undeserved wrongs-that generate obligations.”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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NeoAristotelians have difficulty explaining severe disability.

“As Shane Glackin (2016) has pointed out, neoAristotelians have difficulty explaining severe disability.”

• cites Shane Glackin (2016)Not matched

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There will inevitably be those to whom we owe because they have been wronged by the systematic flaws of social relationships.

“Thus, there will inevitably be those to whom we owe because they have been wronged by the systematic flaws of social relationships (MacIntyre 1999, 101-2, 144).”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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Severely disabled strangers are subject to responsibilities because we cannot effectively oppose ableism at the level of community without opposing it globally.

“Severely disabled strangers are also the subject of responsibilities given that we cannot effectively oppose ablism at the level of community without opposing it globally.”

For MacIntyre, it is possible to extend life past the point at which a dignified death is likely.

“For MacIntyre (2006,, it is possible to extend life past the point at which a dignified death is likely.”

• cites MacIntyre (2006) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

These obligations are generated with respect to the goods of community members and communal relationships that are partially constitutive of the good of a given community.

“These obligations are generated with respect to the goods of community members and communal relationships that are partially constitutive of the good of a given community.”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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Poore's friendly amendment undermines MacIntyre's arguments against liberalism.

“Finally, I suggest that Poore's friendly amendment undermines MacIntyre's arguments against liberalism.”

MacIntyre suggests that community members who lack or have only limited practical reason should be included in communal deliberation through proxies or other means.

“First, he suggests that community members who lack or have only limited practical reason should be included in communal deliberation through proxies or other means (MacIntyre 1999, 130).”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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These traits and goods are easier to specify than the entailments of the thin account of human nature promoted by most Aristotelian naturalists.

“These traits and these goods are easier to specify then the entailments of the thin account of human nature promoted by most Aristotelian naturalists.”

It is in virtue of having social identities that severely disabled people are included in MacIntyrian communities, because social identities are expressible in terms of the common good.

“I argue that it is in virtue of having social identities that severely disabled people are included in MacIntyrian communities specifically because social identities are expressible in terms of the common good.”

Our global responsibilities are tied into our relationships to those nearest and dearest to us.

“This is because our global responsibilities are tied into our relationships to those nearest and dearest to us.”

Poore conflates traditions with the local communities that MacIntyre is concerned with in Dependent Rational Animals.

“And Poore conflates traditions with the local communities that MacIntyre is concerned with in Dependent Rational Animals (DRA).”

• cites Poore 2014 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The social relationship we have with severely disabled people generates obligations towards them with respect to their good and the good of the community.

“Thus, the social relationship we have with severely disabled people generates obligations towards them with respect to their good and the good of the community.”

Disabled people are the victims of systemic flaws in social relationships which manifest in and undermine the relationships of giving and receiving that are essential for communal life.

“The studies above demonstrate that disabled people are the victims of systemic flaws in social relationships which manifest in and undermine the relationships of giving and receiving that are essential for communal life.”

MacIntyre provides mercifulness with a robust secular justification.

“I then argue contra Poore, that MacIntyre provides mercifulness with a robust secular justification.”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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If the moral outsider is both rational and an intelligent mammal, then the moral outsider is governed, at the very least, by an account of virtue that draws on the characteristics of intelligent mammals.

“If the moral outsider is both rational and an intelligent mammal, then the moral outsider is governed-at the very leastby an account of virtue that draws on the characteristics of intelligent mammals.”

The virtues of rational independence are tied to historically embedded practices and traditions.

“The virtues of rational independence are tied to historically embedded practices and traditions.”

To claim that others have responsibilities to us because we are ensouled is the same kind of claim as claiming they have responsibilities because we are human, namely basing moral obligations on what rather than who we are.

“To claim that others have responsibilities to us because we are ensouled, is a claim of the same kind as the claim that others have responsibilities to us because we are humannamely to base moral obligations on what rather than who we are.”

Recent advances in cognitive science indicate that cognition is significantly governed by corporeality.

“My second point is that recent advances in cognitive science indicate that cognition is significantly governed by corporeality.”

• cites Wilson and Foglia (2017)Not matched

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To act in accordance with the virtues of acknowledged dependence is precisely to be rational.

“Here to act in accordance with the virtues of acknowledged dependence is precisely to be rational.”

The virtues of acknowledged dependence are tied to the characteristics human beings share with intelligent mammals which are salient for the purposes of ethics.

“The virtues of acknowledged dependence are tied to the characteristics human beings share with intelligent mammals which are salient for the purposes of ethics.”

When it comes to generating virtues, the traits that humans and other intelligent mammals share will not be irrelevant.

“But this does not mean, once again, that when it comes to generating virtues the traits that humans and other intelligent mammals share will be irrelevant.”

The key to MacIntyre's view is that he only needs to specify that determinations of species membership are conceptually prior to empirical observation in order to accommodate the mutant counterexample.

“But the key to MacIntyre's view is that he only needs to specify that determinations of species membership are conceptually prior to empirical observation in order to accommodate the mutant counterexample.”

The way a member of a species should be changes depending on the typical characteristics of its species.

“The way a member of a species should be changes depending on the typical characteristics of its species.”

An Aristotelian naturalist view that takes embodied cognition on board does not treat human moral agents as abstract persons or rational beings but as uniquely human beings with species-specific biologically constituted rationalities.

“An Aristotelian naturalist view that takes embodied cognition on board, as I recommend, does not treat human moral agents as abstract”

On the author's interpretation of MacIntyre's account, the way a rational member of the class of intelligent mammals should be changes depending on what traits members of that class share.

“On my interpretation of MacIntyre's account the way a rational member of the class of intelligent mammals should be changes depending on what traits members of that class share.”

A solution to the first debate does not entail a solution to the second debate about the moral outsider.

“Though both debates charge MacIntyre with allowing relativism in one form or another, I suggest that a solution to the first debate does not entail a solution to the second, as may be thought.”

Severely disabled people are included in MacIntyre's community in virtue of having goods expressible in narrative fashion, particularly insofar as they are achieved in the common good.

“We may now say that it is in virtue of having goods that are expressible in narrative fashion-particularly insofar as they are achieved in the common good-that severely disabled people are included in MacIntyre's community.”

Our use of concepts to reason is tied to our sensorimotor systems.

“Wilson and Foglia (2017, sec.3.2) mention, for instance, that there is evidence that our use of concepts to reason is tied to our sensorimotor systems.”

• cites Wilson and Foglia (2017, sec.3.2)Not matched

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The proto-rational moral outsider case presents MacIntyre's view with a serious problem: a moral agent for whom no action is strictly unethical.

“The proto-rational moral outsider case appears to present MacIntyre's view with a serious problem-a moral agent for whom no action is strictly speaking unethical.”

Even if commonsensically the Great Red Dragon is insane, his behaviour cannot be condemned on the Footean Aristotelian naturalist scheme as specified here.

“But the problem with this response is that even if commonsensically the Great Red Dragon is insane, his behaviour cannot be condemned on the Footean Aristotelian naturalist scheme as specified here.”

If there are unsavoury traits that only some intelligent mammals have and that intelligent mammals do not share, these traits do not generate virtues.

“Importantly, if there are some unsavoury traits that only some intelligent mammals have-that intelligent mammals do not share-these traits do not generate virtues.”

We cannot appeal to facts to prove that the Great Red Dragon is not a well functioning human being, i.e. insane, without begging the question.

“We cannot appeal to facts to prove that the Great Red Dragon is not a well functioning human being-i.e.insane-without begging the question.”

A MacIntyrian view is not vulnerable to the indeterminacy objection.

“So, a MacIntyrian view is not vulnerable to the indeterminacy objection.”

MacIntyre is successful in dealing with the Great Red Dragon counterexample in part because he does not think that moral norms are solely a rational affair as his critics have suspected.

“To conclude, MacIntyre is successful in dealing with this counterexample in part because he does not think that moral norms are solely a rational affair as his critics have suspected.”

MacIntyre's view is not as vulnerable as other Aristotelian naturalisms to counterexamples like the moral outsider.

“In consequence, his view is not as vulnerable as other Aristotelian naturalisms to counterexamples like the moral outsider.”

Virtues like just generosity and mercifulness, derived from the traits intelligent mammals share, enable us to condemn the Great Red Dragon as his serial killing runs counter to these virtues.

“Virtues like just generosity and mercifulness, derived from the traits intelligent mammals share, enable us to condemn the Great Red Dragon as his serial killing runs counter to these virtues.”

MacIntyre avoids both charges of ethical relativism in virtue of his Aristotelian naturalism.

“It is in virtue of his Aristotelian naturalism that MacIntyre avoids both charges of ethical relativism.”

Because MacIntyre appeals to the collection of intelligent mammals when deriving virtues, membership in this collection determines the group that such norms preside over: fish norms apply to fish, bear norms apply to bears, intelligent mammal norms apply to intelligent mammals.

“And because MacIntyre appeals to the collection of intelligent mammals when deriving virtues, membership in this collection, just as membership in a species for Aristotelian naturalism broadly speaking, determines the group that such norms preside over-fish norms apply to fish, bear norms apply to bears, intelligent mammal norms apply to intelligent mammals.”

All MacIntyre needs to appeal to are what intelligent mammals share in common, humans included.

“Rather, all MacIntyre needs to appeal to are what intelligent mammals share in common, humans included.”

MacIntyre's version of Aristotelian naturalism does not fall for the Pollyanna problem.

“I, in particular, argue that MacIntyre's version of Aristotelian naturalism does not fall for the Pollyanna problem.”

An account that relies upon ensouledness as a guarantor of moral status would neglect social roles and biological constraints, just as the Enlightenment attempt does.

“Just as the Enlightenment attempt-broadly construedneglects social roles and biological constraints, so too would an account that relies upon ensouledness as a guarantor of moral status.”

The only exceptions to disabled people flourishing as well as anyone else are severely cognitively disabled people.

“The only exceptions to this case are severely cognitively disabled people (MacIntyre 1999, 85).”

• cites MacIntyre 1999, 85Not matched

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We can disagree with MacIntyre on the theological character of the good and retain his theory.

“But we can disagree with him and retain his theory.”

MacIntyre's account of virtues of acknowledged dependence and rational independence is consistent with Lott's claim that nothing separates what is good for human beings qua human beings from the claims of reason.

“The first is that MacIntyre's account of virtues of acknowledged dependence and rational independence is consistent with Lott's claim that nothing separates what is good for human beings qua human beings from the claims of reason.”

Poore's friendly amendment is in substantial conflict with MacIntyre's theory.

“Finally, I argue that Poore's friendly amendment is in substantial conflict with MacIntyre's theory.”

If we add MacIntyre's account of rationality to the picture, then the moral outsider is governed in addition by an account of virtue that draws on practices and traditions.

“If we add MacIntyre's account of rationality to the picture, then the moral outsider is governed in addition by an account of virtue that draws on practices and traditions.”

The Pollyanna problem objection neglects MacIntyre's account of rationality.

“Further, while earlier objections to MacIntyre's view neglected MacIntyre's naturalism, this objection neglects MacIntyre's account of rationality.”

Ultimate human goods transcend the scope of individual human activity.

“We can also say, with the MacIntyre of AV, that ultimate human goods transcend the scope of individual human activity.”

• cites MacIntyre of AVNot matched

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Disabled people can flourish as well as anyone else if they have the appropriate character and external goods.

“However, despite this, disabled people can flourish as well as anyone else if they have the appropriate character and external goods.”

A human being who lacks external goods, virtues or both will not be flourishing.

“Now a human being who lacks external goods, virtues or both will not be flourishing.”

Membership in the class of intelligent mammals determines, in part, what virtue amounts to.

“So membership in the class of intelligent mammals determines, in part, what virtue amounts to.”

There is no contradiction in claiming that human flourishing will be very distinct from dolphin flourishing given that humans are rational, and dolphins are not.

“But there is no contradiction in claiming, for example, that human flourishing will be very distinct from dolphin flourishing given that humans are rational, and dolphins are not.”

MacIntyre's Aristotelian naturalism is able to answer Woodcock's membership objection.

“I develop a new response to counterexamples MacIntyre's account has faced and argue that MacIntyre's Aristotelian naturalism is able to answer Woodcock's membership objection.”

Biology determines how we interact with, perceive and are affected by the world.

“Biology determines how we interact with, perceive and are affected by the world.”

These traits generate a number of virtues for rational beings: the virtues of acknowledged dependence.

“These traits generate a number of virtues for rational beingsthe virtues of acknowledged dependence.”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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MacIntyre's account of rationality leaves him vulnerable to counterexamples like the Great Red Dragon.

“MacIntyre's account of rationality leaves him vulnerable to counterexamples like the Great Red Dragon.”

None of this suggests that disabled people are foreclosed from flourishing.

“But none of this suggests that disabled people are foreclosed from flourishing.”

What matters is whether the moral outsider is a rational, intelligent mammal, something empirically knowable.

“What matters here is whether the moral outsider is a rational, intelligent mammal-something empirically knowable.”

MacIntyre's strategy for dealing with the relativistic moral outsider is to silence them.

“MacIntyre's strategy for dealing with the relativistic moral outsider is to silence them.”

It is in virtue of the capacity to be subjects of narratives that those unable to narrate can have roles and social identities.

“It is in virtue of this capacity that they can have roles and social identities-white South African, niece, Millennial, friend and elder, for example.”

MacIntyre's account avoids the quandary of treating non-rational people as having moral status by focusing on social identity.

“Happily, MacIntyre's account avoids this quandary by focusing on social identity.”

Ableism often pervades social relationships and where it does it can systematically undermine the possibility of disabled people achieving the external goods they need and developing the characters they need to flourish.

“Ableism often pervades social relationships and where it does it can systematically undermine the possibility of disabled people achieving the external goods they need and developing the characters they need to flourish (McCracken 2022).”

• cites McCracken 2022Not matched

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To have the virtues of acknowledged dependence, one must be able to do what rational people are able to do.

“In order to have the virtues of acknowledged dependence, one must be able to do what rational people are able to do.”

Severely cognitively disabled people and other dependent practical reasoners can flourish, albeit not fully, through the provision of appropriate external goods and the presence of proxy decision-makers.

“In this case MacIntyre likely means that severely cognitively disabled people and other dependent practical reasoners can flourish-albeit not”

• cites MacIntyre 1999, 130, 147Not matched

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Because human potentialities can only be fully expressed with reference to the good of a community in which storytelling exists, severely disabled people and anyone at all are members of these communities.

“It is then just because of the fact that these potentialities can only be fully expressed with reference to the good of a community in which the practice of storytelling exists, that severely disabled people-and, indeed, anyone at all-are members of these communities.”

MacIntyre appeals to the group of intelligent mammals.

“MacIntyre appeals to the group of intelligent mammals.”

• cites MacIntyre 1999Not matched

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The exercise of self-knowledge means that whatever one gives when exercising mercifulness will be proportionate to the needs of those affected because of knowledge of the relevant injustices.

“The exercise of this virtue means that whatever one gives when exercising mercifulness will be proportionate to the needs of those affected because of knowledge of the relevant injustices (MacIntyre 2016, 112-3, 211-4).”

• cites MacIntyre 2016, 112-3, 211-4Not matched

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Concepts like rape and murder only have non-metaphorical significance for beings who can reason.

“However, concepts like rape and murder only have non-metaphorical significance for beings who can reason.”

Narration is a social practice.

“Importantly, narration is a social practice.”

• cites MacIntyreNot matched

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These ultimate goods need not be theological, in contrast with the later MacIntyre.

“These ultimate goods, in contrast with the later MacIntyre, need not be theological.”

The way Aristotelian naturalism often functions is by deriving moral norms from the typical constitution of a species.

“As we have discussed, the way that Aristotelian naturalism often functions is by deriving moral norms from the typical constitution of a species.”

Those unable to narrate-such as the very young or the very old-can nonetheless be the subjects of narratives.

“Thus, those unable to narrate-say, the very young or the very old-can nonetheless be the subjects of narratives.”

MacIntyre's theory, unlike other neo-Aristotelian theories, can explain our responsibilities towards disabled people with reference to ableism.

“Unlike other neo-Aristotelian theories, he can explain our responsibilities towards disabled people with reference to ableism.”

Human animals can only realize their characteristic goods, flourish, and be fully human within a local community.

“We can, for instance, say with Aristotle (Politics I.2, 1253a1-37, trans.Jowett) that human animals can only realize their characteristic goods-can only flourish, can only be fully human-within a local community.”

• cites Aristotle (Politics I.2, 1253a1-37, trans.Jowett)Not matched

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To claim that souls generate ethical responsibilities is to replicate parts of the Enlightenment attempt to justify morality, which MacIntyre has argued against at length.

“And I suggest that to claim that souls generate ethical responsibilities is to replicate parts of the Enlightenment attempt to justify morality-something that MacIntyre (2016, 114-65) has argued against at length.”

• cites MacIntyre (2016, 114-65)Not matched

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If we lacked opposable thumbs, the scope of possible reasons we could have would change.

“If we lacked opposable thumbs the scope of possible reasons we could have would change”

Aristotle counts things like wealth, political power and friends as external goods.

“He counts things like wealth, political power and friends as external goods (ll.1099a33-b1).”

• cites Aristotle 2001Not matched

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Given that whether or not the moral outsider is an intelligent mammal is an empirical matter, the moral outsider cannot evade the norms of rationality that issue from being a rational intelligent mammal by claiming to be a different species.

“Given that whether or not the moral outsider is an intelligent mammal is an empirical matter, the moral outsider cannot evade the norms of rationality that issue from being a rational intelligent mammal by claiming to be a different species.”

Nothing MacIntyre suggests contradicts the claim that virtues of acknowledged dependency are tied to what human beings share with other intelligent mammals.

“I respond by pointing out that even though virtues may be the purview of dependent rational animals, nothing MacIntyre suggests contradicts the claim that virtues of acknowledged dependency are tied to what human beings share with other intelligent mammals.”

Our biology governs what we reason about.

“Our biology does not just govern how we reason, but also what we reason about.”

Rationality is not biologically constrained so much as biologically constituted.

“rationality is not biologically constrained so much as biologically constituted.”

Whatever our rational dispositions, we must abide by the virtues of acknowledged dependence rooted in our biological, animal first natures.

“Whatever our rational dispositions, we must abide by the virtues of acknowledged dependence rooted in our biological, animal first natures.”

Advances in technology have not resulted in new, specific and unique internal goods that ground a list of the virtues, now global in scope.

“So Vallor's point that technology changes practices is correct, but it is far from clear that advances in technology have resulted in new, specific and unique internal goods that ground a list of the virtues, now global in scope.”

It remains possible for a severely cognitively disabled person to flourish to a greater extent than a non-severely cognitively disabled person.

“But it remains possible for a severely cognitively disabled person to flourish to a greater extent than a non-severely cognitively disabled person.”

If internal goods are no longer exclusive to practices and specific kinds of practices and could be shared by all practices and non-practices, then the list of possible virtues will be infinite and absurd.

“If internal goods are no longer exclusive to practices and specific kinds of practices and instead could be shared by all practices and by human activities that are not practices, then the list of possible virtues will be infinite and absurd.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Internal goods are partially definitive of practices.

If one resists only in one's own community, the overarching global flaws in social relationships remain and always threaten to permeate the community's boundaries.

“For if one does so, the overarching-i.e.global-flaws in the social relationship remain and always threaten to permeate the community's boundaries.”

MacIntyre already seems to endorse a modern account of social justice.

“I argue that partial relationships-the relationships we have to those in our communities, specifically-generate global responsibilities when supplemented by a modern account of social justice-one that the neoAristotelian Alasdair MacIntyre already seems to endorse (MacIntyre 1999: 101-103; McCracken 2022: 763).”

• cites MacIntyre 1999: 101-103Not matched

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• cites McCracken 2022: 763Not matched

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Species might be too unstable a ground for normative guidance.

“Unfortunately, species might be too unstable a ground for normative guidance.”

These relationships can be corrupted by the systematic flaws of some particular set of social relationships in which they are embedded.

“However, these relationships can be corrupted by the”

• cites MacIntyre 1999: 102Not matched

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The possibilities of flourishing for those who are unable to reason are somewhat diminished.

“Admittedly the possibilities of flourishing for those who are so unable to reason are somewhat diminished.”

Without MacIntyre to do the theoretical legwork, Vallor's account does not appear to succeed.

“But without MacIntyre to do the theoretical legwork, it does not appear Vallor's account succeeds.”

Neo-Aristotelians have some explaining to do when it comes to our responsibilities to distant others.

“This is to say, that neoAristotelians have some explaining to do when it comes to our responsibilities to distant others.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Neo-Aristotelian theories like Vallor's generally attempt to ground our responsibilities to those both close and far away by tying moral virtues to human flourishing.

No-connection theories, because of their abstractness and generality, are unable to give clear, tangible, and pressing reasons that hook onto the lived experiences of those they address.

“No-connection theories, because of their abstractness and generality are unable to give clear, tangible, and pressing reasons that hook onto the lived experiences of those they address.”

Any community permeated by systematic flaws of social relationships will be unable to achieve its common good and thus unable to flourish.

“So any community-like many communities that exist todaywhich is permeated by the systematic flaws of social relationships-flaws that impede virtue and express vice-will be unable to achieve its common good and thus unable to flourish.”

Vallor's proposed internal goods no longer seem tenable because they are not clearly the goods of a particular kind of practice, but rather the goods of many kinds of practices or non-practices or both.

“This means that her proposed internal goods-which would have given the virtues a clear global scope-no longer seem tenable precisely because these are not clearly the goods of a particular kind of practice, but rather the goods of many kinds of practices or non-practices or both.”

Even if Aristotelian naturalists follow the author's recommendations, they will still need to take on parts of MacIntyre's view in order to deal with the indeterminacy objection.

“I go on to suggest that even if Aristotelian naturalists follow my recommendations here, they will still need to take on parts of MacIntyre's view in order to deal with the indeterminacy objection.”

It is not clear that simultaneously global, cooperative, and technosocial activity is necessary to achieve intercultural understanding, global justice, human security, or collective human wisdom.

“Unfortunately, this is also the case for intercultural understanding, global justice, human security and collective human wisdom.It is not at all clear that simultaneously global, cooperative and technosocial activity is necessary to achieve any of these.”

To have responsibilities to subvert homophobia is also to have responsibilities to trans people, disabled people, upper-class people and so on who are affected by homophobia.

“The nature of homophobia changes depending on the social context-and in part based on social identity-so to have responsibilities to subvert homophobia is also to have responsibilities to trans people, disabled people, upper-class people and so on who are affected by homophobia.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is a relationship between oppression along one axis and oppression along others.

No-connection theories are incomplete because there is always a further question of why these responsibilities are ours, why they should hook on to us specifically.

“In other words, these arguments are incomplete for there is always a further question of why these responsibilities are ours-why they should hook on to us specifically.”

It is not apparent that Unfreedom for All provides a motivationally compelling account of injustice that explains why both privileged and marginalized people are subject to it.

“But is not apparent that Unfreedom for All-despite its venerable ties to the Black civil rights movement-does this.”

When integrated with MacIntyre's view, Donahue-Ochoa's account gives us a way to understand the subjects of social relationships.

“When integrated with MacIntyre's view, this account gives us a way to understand the subjects of social relationships-the sorts of relationships I believe generate global responsibilities.”

The nature of homophobia changes depending on the social context and in part based on social identity.

“The nature of homophobia changes depending on the social context-and in part based on social identity-so to have responsibilities to subvert homophobia is also to have responsibilities to trans people, disabled people, upper-class people and so on who are affected by homophobia.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is a relationship between oppression along one axis and oppression along others.

Various technologies available in the modern world are merely supplements to existing practices rather than constituting a new practice or set of practices.

“it seems like the various technologies available in the modern world, rather than constituting a new practice or set of practices, are merely supplements to existing ones.”

• cites MacIntyre (1981: 186)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Given the nature of injustice, we cannot effectively resist injustice at the local level without resisting it globally.

“This is because, given the nature of injustice, we cannot effectively resist injustice at the local level without resisting it globally”

External goods do not ground virtues.

“But external goods do not ground virtues, for if they did, once again, the list of virtues would be infinite and absurd.”

It is not clear how a neo-Aristotelian can hold abstaining from products of sweated labour to be vicious.

“and thus it is not clear how a neoAristotelian can hold such an action to be vicious.”

Partial relationships generate global responsibilities when supplemented by a modern account of social justice.

“I argue that partial relationships-the relationships we have to those in our communities, specifically-generate global responsibilities when supplemented by a modern account of social justice-one that the neoAristotelian Alasdair MacIntyre already seems to endorse (MacIntyre 1999: 101-103; McCracken 2022: 763).”

• cites MacIntyre 1999: 101-103Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites McCracken 2022: 763Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: We have responsibilities to those closest to us.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: We have identity-based responsibilities that issue from race, class, ability, gender, sexuality and so on.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: We have responsibilities to undo the oppression of those who are oppressed in virtue of their identities.

A MacIntyrian account generates global obligations.

“And this is how, I suggest, a MacIntyrian account generates global obligations.”

For every sufficiently connected community, achievement of its common good depends on achievement of the common good of others, for its unique realization.

“achievement of the common good of each community however unique, depends on the achievement of the common good of the others, for its unique realization.And this is true of every sufficiently connected community.”

The nature of systematic flaws in social relationships means that we must resist injustice both at the level of those nearest and dearest to us and at the international level.

“I argue that the nature of systematic flaws in social relationships mean that we must resist injustice both at the level of those nearest and dearest to us and at the international level.”

Donahue-Ochoa's theory is not successful.

“However, I will argue that his theory is not successful.”

It is not clear that things that restrict our freedom are necessarily unjust.

“Importantly, it is not clear that things that restrict our freedom are necessarily unjust.”

Subverting flawed social relationships is a key component of virtuous action, individual human flourishing and communal flourishing.

“And this means that subverting these flawed social relationships-be they racist, classist, transphobic and so on-is a key component of virtuous action, individual human flourishing and communal flourishing.”

The goods Vallor names do not appear to be specific to technomoral practices.

“And whatever Vallor claims, the goods she names do not appear to be specific to technomoral practices.”

Special-connection theories have not historically been able to give universal reasons for acting against injustice.

“Special-connection theories on the other hand have nothistorically-been able to give universal reasons for acting against injustice, at least, until now.”

Other practices and non-practice activities, such as storytelling, can pursue many of the goods Vallor names.

“Other practices and non-practice activities exist which can, at least, pursue many of these goods-perhaps the most obvious being storytelling which can pursue all of them.”

It is insufficient to resist and subvert these flaws only in one's own community.

“But notice that it is insufficient to resist and subvert these flaws only in one's own community.”

Injustice is bad for oppressed and non-oppressed people.

“This is a sense in which it is bad for oppressed and non-oppressed people.”

Here species does not necessarily generate clear normative guidance.

“Here species does not necessarily generate clear normative guidance.”

Narrative is particularly important to understanding why we have responsibilities to undo these systematic flaws.

“Narrative is particularly important to understanding why we have responsibilities to undo these systematic flaws.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: We have responsibilities to undo the oppression of those who are oppressed in virtue of their identities.

The reason Donahue-Ochoa's view fails to motivate is that the ways we are unfree do not correspond to situations in which that unfreedom actually matters to us, because often whatever we lose from that unfreedom, we gain much more.

“And this is because the ways that we are unfree do not correspond to situations in which that unfreedom actually matters to us, because often whatever we lose from that unfreedom, we gain much more.”

Members of such a community are unlikely to flourish without attempting to eliminate these flaws.

“Similarly, its members are unlikely to flourish in such a community without attempting to eliminate these flaws because achieving one's own good is interwoven with contributing to the achievement of the good of the community as a whole.”

The only way to act virtuously with respect to members of one's own community is to resist and subvert the flaws of social relationships globally.

“So the only way to act virtuously with respect to the members of one's own community is to resist and subvert the flaws of social relationships globally.”

Without absolute resistance, injustice will continue to infect our proximate relationships from without.

“for without such absolute resistance, injustice will continue to infect our proximate relationships from without.”

No-connection theories of global justice are generally not as compelling as they could be.

“This is why no-connection theories of global justicewhich argue for universal, abstract responsibilities to remediate injusticeare generally not as compelling as they could be.”

Injustice restricts our freedom.

“It restricts our freedom.”

Global community cannot be an internal good of practices.

“So global community cannot be an internal good of practices.”

The contributions we make to injustices are often the results of what we as societies think is valuable.

“For one, the contributions we make to injustices are often the results of what we as societies think is valuable-think fast fashion and driving cars.”

It is consistent with a neo-Aristotelian view to say that different expectations fall on people of different means.

“So it is consistent with a neoAristotelian view to say that different expectations fall on people of different means.”

Virtue appears differently with respect to the means one possesses, distinguishing generosity from magnificence.

“Moreover, Aristotle (2014, 1125a35-b5) himself recognizes that virtue appears differently with respect to the means one possesses, distinguishing generosity from magnificence-a virtue of the very wealthy.”

• cites Aristotle (2014, 1125a35-b5)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

There is empirical evidence that oppression crosses borders.

“There is also empirical evidence that oppression crosses borders.”

• cites Hall 2018Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Dikötter 2011Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Oppression is global.

“This is because, as I have suggested, oppression is global and must be countered globally; merely countering oppression within a given community leaves that community at continued risk of oppression permeating its boundaries.”

If there is a relationship between oppression along one axis and oppression along others, then the oppression within a racially homogeneous community is influenced by oppression outside this community along racial lines.

“If the above relationship exists, then the oppression within this community is influenced by oppression outside this community along racial lines because sexuality groups, class groups and so on all share a relationship with race and racism.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is a relationship between oppression along one axis and oppression along others.

Human rights are routinely violated.

“Not only are these rights routinely violated, but they have been criticized as baseless and Eurocentric (MacIntyre 1981: 64-65;Mutua 2001: 233).”

A community where oppression has been eliminated is a fiction.

“This means that a community where oppression has been eliminated is a fiction.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Whatever the population, within that population there will exist hierarchies of power, and with them, oppression.

There are historical instances of international forces spreading racism.

“There are, for example, historical instances of international forces spreading racism (Hall 2018(Hall : 2135(Hall -2138;;Dikötter 2011: 28, 31).”

• cites Hall 2018Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Dikötter 2011Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Even special-connection accounts are sometimes lacking.

“But even special-connection accounts are sometimes lacking.”

The bulk of absolute resistance theory need not only apply to a MacIntyrian view, but any view in which there are communal, subnational or national responsibilities.

“Importantly, the bulk of absolute resistance theory need not only apply to a MacIntyrian view, but any view in which there are communal, subnational or national responsibilities.”

If a motivation to fight injustice is to be found, it will not be ultimately found in human rights.

“If a motivation to fight injustice is to be found, it will not be ultimately found in human rights-even as valuable a legal and political measure they can be.”

Whether a particular organism is so constrained can be determined empirically, by their membership in the class of intelligent mammals.

“And most importantly, whether a particular organism is so constrained can be determined empirically, by their membership in the class of intelligent mammals.”

MacIntyre can accommodate our responsibilities to severely disabled strangers.

“In contrast with Gregory Poore who thought that a neoAristotelian MacIntyrian could not accommodate our responsibilities to severely disabled strangers, I argued that MacIntyre can.”

MacIntyre's naturalism can solve Woodcock's moral outsider problem.

“I argued that MacIntyre's naturalism can solve this problem.”

The bounds on character set by these virtues constrain other virtues.

“Critically, the bounds on character set by these virtues constrain other virtues.”

Our responsibilities to global others are grounded in our responsibilities to those closest to us.

“I have argued that our responsibilities to global others are grounded in our responsibilities to those closest to us.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The surest path to human flourishing is a flourishing human community.

Current debates over oppression assume that oppression at the individual level and oppression at the systemic level are linked.

“Current debates over oppression assume that oppression at the individual level and oppression at the systemic level are linked, for instance (Liao and Huebner 2021: 93; Soon 2021: 9; 2020: 1858).”

• cites Liao and Huebner 2021Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Soon 2021Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Soon 2020Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

It is by traits all intelligent mammals share that one portion of our list of the virtues is generated.

“It is by traits they all share that one portion of our list of the virtues is generated.”

The absolute resistance view motivationally bootstraps our responsibilities to things we already have good reason to care about.

“Unlike the views of Donahue-Ochoa or Vallor, the no-connectionists or the special-connectionists, the absolute resistance view I have developed here motivationally bootstraps our responsibilities to things we already have good reason to care about.”

It is far from clear that thin solidarity is a firm ground to motivate the subversion of injustice.

“It is far from clear-and indeed given persistent conflicts around the globe very far from clear-that thin solidarity is a firm ground to motivate the subversion of injustice.”

In cases where blame is clear, guilt and shame are dubious motivators.

“And in cases where blame is clear, as established, guilt and shame are dubious motivators.”

Solidarity as a ground for moral responsibility is not clearly effective where that solidarity is thin.

“Similarly, solidarity-whether special-connection-based or not-as a ground for moral responsibility is not clearly effective where that solidarity is thin.”

Oppression must be countered globally.

“This is because, as I have suggested, oppression is global and must be countered globally; merely countering oppression within a given community leaves that community at continued risk of oppression permeating its boundaries.”

Those in very poor communities, who struggle to procure basic necessities, will have vastly fewer international responsibilities than those in comparatively wealthy communities.

“Those in very poor communities, who struggle to procure basic necessities, will have vastly fewer international responsibilities than those in comparatively wealthy communities, for example.”

No-connection accounts are incomplete because they do not give a compelling account as to why privileged people should do anything about global injustice.

“Earlier I suggested that no-connection accounts are incomplete.This is because they, in and of themselves, do not give a compelling account as to why privileged people should do anything about global injustice.”

Racial oppression influences the oppression that already exists in a racially homogeneous group, even if racism is not felt owing to racial homogeny, because of intersectionality.

“What this means is that racial oppression influences the oppression that already exists in this group, even if racism is not felt owing to racial homogeny, because of intersectionality.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is a relationship between oppression along one axis and oppression along others.

Isolated tribes in the jungle do not have responsibilities to the outside world because they are not connected to the outside world.

“Isolated tribes in the jungle do not have responsibilities to the outside world because they are not connected to the outside world.”

Even if this is a community of white people, oppression can exist along the lines of sexuality, class, ability and so on.

“Even if this is a community of white people, oppression can exist along the lines of sexuality, class, ability and so on.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Modern communities are almost inevitably characterized by diversity with respect to race, class, sexuality, gender, religion, ability, age and so on.
• AssumptionRests on an assumption: No one can be characterized as just one sort of person.

Oppression cannot be effectively resisted merely at the level of our most cherished relationships.

“This is because, as I have already specified, oppression cannot be effectively resisted merely at the level of our most cherished relationships.”

If we have reason to oppose injustice at the communal level, we have reason to oppose injustice at the global level.

“This rationale provides both the grounding and the motivation for global responsibilities as on my account, if we have reason to oppose injustice at the communal level, we have reason to oppose injustice at the global level.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The surest path to human flourishing is a flourishing human community.

Neo-Aristotelians can include strangers in their theorizing.

“In this dissertation I have explained how neoAristotelians can include strangers in their theorizing.”

So long as we only oppose oppression in our relationships with those nearest and dearest to us, oppression will continue to infringe upon those relationships from the outside.

“So long as we only oppose oppression in our relationships with those nearest and dearest to us, oppression will continue to infringe upon those relationships from the outside.”

Severely disabled strangers, the moral outsider, and distant people can be accommodated on a neo-Aristotelian scheme.

“In this dissertation I have explained how severely disabled strangers, the moral outsider, and distant people can be accommodated on a neoAristotelian scheme.”

Global action would not influence intracommunity oppression in a community where the only oppression is not present elsewhere.

“Here, global action would not influence intracommunity oppression.”

Merely countering oppression within a given community leaves that community at continued risk of oppression permeating its boundaries.

“This is because, as I have suggested, oppression is global and must be countered globally; merely countering oppression within a given community leaves that community at continued risk of oppression permeating its boundaries.”

Alasdair MacIntyre, in contrast to Poore's evaluation, can include severely disabled people in communities for the reason that such a reason is a sufficient criterion for explaining why severely disabled people are members of human communities.

“My argument has merely been that Alasdair MacIntyre, in contrast to Poore's evaluation, can include severely disabled people in communities for this reason-that such a reason is a sufficient criterion for explaining why severely disabled people are members of human communities.”

• cites Poore 2014 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

If special obligations to fellow citizens include obligations to subvert and negate oppressive systems, then from my account it follows that we have similar global obligations.

“If these obligations include obligations to subvert and negate oppressive systems, then from my account it follows that we have similar global obligations.”

In cases of no contact, no global responsibilities exist.

“In such cases of no contact, I think it is plausible to think that no global responsibilities exist.”

There is evidence that different sorts of oppression are linked.

“And not only this, but there is also evidence that different sorts of oppression are linked.”

Thick solidarity is far more motivating than thin solidarity.

“Clearly the latter-thick-solidarity is far more motivating.”

It is our relationships to those we care about, to those we encounter, within which our global responsibilities are grounded.

“It is our relationships to those we care about, to those we encounter, within which our global responsibilities are grounded.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The surest path to human flourishing is a flourishing human community.

Whenever we meet severely disabled strangers outside our communities, or should they come in, we already have responsibilities towards them rooted in our communal flourishing.

“This means that whenever we meet severely disabled strangers outside our communities, or should they come in, we already have responsibilities towards them rooted in our communal flourishing.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Having a good that is only definable in terms of a communal good is necessary and sufficient for membership in that community.

External goods are a precondition of the very possibility of being ethical.

“This is, for one, because as Aristotle (2014: 1099a30-b6) highlights, external goods are a precondition of the very possibility of being ethical.”

• cites Aristotle (2014: 1099a30-b6)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The sort of guilt and shame that contribution-based arguments are designed to provoke are not in and of themselves necessarily or powerfully motivating in desirable ways.

“And the sort of guilt and shame that this sort of argument is designed to provoke are not in and of themselves necessarily or powerfully motivating in desirable ways (Cameron 2018: 724;Boudewyns, Turner, and Paquin 2013: 817-18).”

• cites Cameron 2018: 724Not matched

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• cites Boudewyns, Turner, and Paquin 2013: 817-18Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.