The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Distributional and Peer‐Induced Fairness in Supply Chain Contract Design
Open accessAbstract
Members of a supply chain often make profit comparisons. A retailer exhibits peer‐induced fairness concerns when his own profit is behind that of a peer retailer interacting with the same supplier. In addition, a retailer exhibits distributional fairness when his supplier's share of total profit is larger than his own. While existing research focuses exclusively on distributional fairness concerns, this study investigates how both types of fairness might interact and influence economic outcomes in a supply chain. We consider a one‐supplier and two‐retailer supply chain setting, and we show that (i) in the presence of distributional fairness alone, the wholesale price offer is lower than the standard wholesale price offer; (ii) in the presence of both types of fairness, the second wholesale price is higher than the first wholesale price; and (iii) in the presence of both types of fairness, the second retailer makes a lower profit and has a lower share of the total supply chain profit than the first retailer. We run controlled experiments with subjects motivated by substantial monetary incentives and show that subject behaviors are consistent with the model predictions. Structural estimation on the data suggests that peer‐induced fairness is more salient than distributional fairness.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
The use of pledges to build and sustain commitment in distribution channels
Anderson, E., & Weitz, B. (1992) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1177/002224379202900103 · Cited by 3,431 · cited 1×
“Fairness matters in business-to-business transactions too (Anderson and Weitz 1992, Kahneman et al. 1986).”
BackgroundFairness and Channel Coordination
Haitao Cui, T., Raju, J. S., & Zhang, Z. J. (2007) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0697 · Cited by 705
Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance: An Experimental Study
Loch, C. H., & Wu, Y. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0910 · Cited by 457
Self-citationBounded Rationality in Newsvendor Models
Su, X. (2008) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1070.0200 · Cited by 411
Self-citationHo, T.-H., & Zhang, J. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0788 · Cited by 331
Self-citationFairness in supply chain contracts: A laboratory study
Katok, E., & Pavlov, V. (2013) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2013.01.001 · Cited by 274
Cited by
Fairness in supply chain contracts: A laboratory study
Katok, E., & Pavlov, V. (2013) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2013.01.001 · Cited by 274
Metadata
- Authors
- Ho, T., Su, X., & Wu, Y.
- Venue
- Production and Operations Management
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2014-02
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 161-175
- ISSN
- 1059-1478 (ISSN-L)
- 1937-5956
- OpenAlex
- W3123778148
- Cited by
- 272
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 16.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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