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Cited by 13Feminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesHermeneutics and Narrative IdentityEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Hermeneutical Injustice and Liberatory Education

Elzinga, Benjamin·2018·The Southern Journal of Philosophy
DOI 10.1111/sjp.12268
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Abstract

Hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a gap in the interpretive resources available to members of a society due to the marginalization of members of a social group from sense‐making practices. In this paper, I address two questions about hermeneutical injustice that are undertheorized in the recent literature: (1) what do we mean when we say that someone lacks the interpretive resources for making sense of an experience? and (2) how do marginalized individuals develop interpretive resources? In response to (1), I argue that to lack interpretive resources is to lack conceptual skill or know how. In response to (2), I draw on resources from Gilbert Ryle and Andy Clark and provide a model of how marginalized individuals develop new conceptual skills by naming their shared experience and using it as a tool for scaffolding each other's conceptual performance. At the same time, I draw on the work of Gaile Pohlhaus and Kristie Dotson to show how these practices succeed only through the redistribution of epistemic power across differently situated social groups.

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  • This dimension of hermeneutical agency is captured by what Benjamin Elzinga calls conceptual know-how: the kind of inferential and perceptual skills required of us if we are to engage in the engineering of concepts.

    “This dimension of hermeneutical agency is captured by what Benjamin Elzinga (2016 , 2018 ) calls conceptual know-how : the kind of inferential and perceptual skills required of us if we are to engage in the engineering of concepts.”

    From Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power (2025) · cites this paper as Elzinga 2018

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Authors
Elzinga, B.
Corresponding author
Elzinga, Benjamin
ORCID
Elzinga, Benjamin
Venue
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2018-03
Volume
56
Issue
1
Pages
59-82
ISSN
  • 0038-4283 (ISSN-L)
  • 2041-6962
DOI
10.1111/sjp.12268
OpenAlex
W2795394191
Cited by
13
References
34
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1
FWCI
2.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor, 24 d)
Locations
The Southern Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
hermeneutical injustice, know-how, marginalized individuals, sensemaking, conceptual performance, epistemic power, emancipatory education, social marginalization, Ryle, Andy Clark

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