The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.
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In the citing paper
“Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrate that emphasizing different aspects of identical outcomes systematically shifts decisions.”
From Sycophancy Negatively Affects LLM-as-a-Judge in Conflict Evaluation (2026) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
In the citing paper
“In line with previous findings of Tversky and Kahneman (1981), higher-income participants were more likely to travel to obtain the discount on lower purchase prices, suggesting that they valued the offer in relative terms.”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
In the citing paper
“Similarly, they did not find significant differences between both income groups for the mental budgeting effect in the lost ticket scenario (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman 1981
In the citing paper
“Decision-making research has demonstrated that a decision maker's utility is highly subjective and may include variables, such as personal gain, risk tolerance, relevance to related events, and value of a decision to the organization [22,28,44,46,47,54].”
From Rationality versus reality: the challenges of evidence-based decision making for health policy makers (2010) · cites this paper as [28]
In the citing paper
“Moreover, the very nature of cognitive processing highlights the role of internally generated influences that occur during cognitive processing, influencing a policy maker and serving as a source of non-rational decision making [28,32,46,47].”
From Rationality versus reality: the challenges of evidence-based decision making for health policy makers (2010) · cites this paper as [28]
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Self-citationProspect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
Self-citationTversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Self-citationJudgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
Self-citationA BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE
Simon, H. A. (1955) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884852 · Cited by 15,877
“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
(2001) · Empirical Direction in Design and Analysis · doi:10.4324/9781410600004-24 · Cited by 6,808
Rational choice and the structure of the environment.
Simon, H. A. (1956) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0042769 · Cited by 5,919
Toward a positive theory of consumer choice
Thaler, R. (1980) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(80)90051-7 · Cited by 5,505
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.
Cherniak, C., Nisbett, R., & Ross, L. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184495 · Cited by 4,196
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Galanter, E., Sensation and Measurement: 65 (1974).
Cited by
Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment
Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611 · Cited by 9,953
Slovic, P. (1987) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.3563507 · Cited by 9,271
Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems
Endsley, M. R. (1995) · Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society · doi:10.1518/001872095779049543 · Cited by 8,875
Strategic assets and organizational rent
Amit, R., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250140105 · Cited by 8,425
Organizational learning: The contributing processes and the literatures
Huber, G. P. (1991) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2.1.88 · Cited by 8,072
Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- University of British Columbia (CA)
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 1981-01-30
- Volume
- 211
- Issue
- 4481
- Pages
- 453-458
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2096452841
- Cited by
- 18,497
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2026: 837 · 2025: 899 · 2024: 828 · 2023: 807 · 2022: 706 · 2021: 967 · 2020: 835 · 2019: 901 · 2018: 843 · 2017: 713 · 2016: 743 · 2015: 790 · 2014: 790 · 2013: 733 · 2012: 724
- FWCI
- 45.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Environmental Valuation
- Keywords
- framing effects, decision-making, probability judgment, preference reversal, risk perception, monetary outcomes, rational choice theory, perceptual appearance
- MeSH terms
- Choice Behavior, Decision Making, Humans, Probability
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