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The disclosure of diagnosis codes can breach research participants' privacy

Open access
Loukides, Grigorios, Denny, Joshua C, Malin, Bradley · 2010 · Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
Cited by 140

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

OBJECTIVE: De-identified clinical data in standardized form (eg, diagnosis codes), derived from electronic medical records, are increasingly combined with research data (eg, DNA sequences) and disseminated to enable scientific investigations. This study examines whether released data can be linked with identified clinical records that are accessible via various resources to jeopardize patients' anonymity, and the ability of popular privacy protection methodologies to prevent such an attack. DESIGN: The study experimentally evaluates the re-identification risk of a de-identified sample of Vanderbilt's patient records involved in a genome-wide association study. It also measures the level of protection from re-identification, and data utility, provided by suppression and generalization. MEASUREMENT: Privacy protection is quantified using the probability of re-identifying a patient in a larger population through diagnosis codes. Data utility is measured at a dataset level, using the percentage of retained information, as well as its description, and at a patient level, using two metrics based on the difference between the distribution of Internal Classification of Disease (ICD) version 9 codes before and after applying privacy protection. RESULTS: More than 96% of 2800 patients' records are shown to be uniquely identified by their diagnosis codes with respect to a population of 1.2 million patients. Generalization is shown to reduce further the percentage of de-identified records by less than 2%, and over 99% of the three-digit ICD-9 codes need to be suppressed to prevent re-identification. CONCLUSIONS: Popular privacy protection methods are inadequate to deliver a sufficiently protected and useful result when sharing data derived from complex clinical systems. The development of alternative privacy protection models is thus required.

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Crossref · 10.1136/jamia.2009.002725

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Citations

Cites

  • k-ANONYMITY: A MODEL FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY

    SWEENEY, L. (2002) · International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems · doi:10.1142/s0218488502001648 · Cited by 8,571 · cited 3×

    “…by removing explicit identi fi ers, such as Social Security Numbers, from sensitive biomedical data and modifying the values of quasi-identi fi ers; ie, attributes that in combination can link to external resources to uncover patient identity, such as demographics 7 and health-provider visits.”
    BackgroundInfluential
  • Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets

    Narayanan, A., & Shmatikov, V. (2008) · 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008) · doi:10.1109/sp.2008.33 · Cited by 2,372 · cited 2×

    “To provide such guarantees, anonymization methods for sparse and high-dimensional data that are proposed by the data mining community can be employed.(24) However, these methods do not exploit the semantics of EMR data and are therefore unlikely to preserve data utility in the context of biomedical research.”
    BackgroundMethod

Cited by

See all 140

Metadata

Authors
Loukides, G., Denny, J. C., & Malin, B.
Venue
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
Published
2010-05
Volume
17
Issue
3
Pages
322-327
ISSN
  • 1067-5027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1527-974X
OpenAlex
W2141640676
Cited by
140
References
2
FWCI
14.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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