Cited by 2,961Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in Computing

Model Inversion Attacks that Exploit Confidence Information and Basic Countermeasures

Open access
Fredrikson, Matt, Jha, Somesh, Ristenpart, Thomas·2015·Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Abstract

Machine-learning (ML) algorithms are increasingly utilized in privacy-sensitive applications such as predicting lifestyle choices, making medical diagnoses, and facial recognition. In a model inversion attack, recently introduced in a case study of linear classifiers in personalized medicine by Fredrikson et al., adversarial access to an ML model is abused to learn sensitive genomic information about individuals. Whether model inversion attacks apply to settings outside theirs, however, is unknown. We develop a new class of model inversion attack that exploits confidence values revealed along with predictions. Our new attacks are applicable in a variety of settings, and we explore two in depth: decision trees for lifestyle surveys as used on machine-learning-as-a-service systems and neural networks for facial recognition. In both cases confidence values are revealed to those with the ability to make prediction queries to models. We experimentally show attacks that are able to estimate whether a respondent in a lifestyle survey admitted to cheating on their significant other and, in the other context, show how to recover recognizable images of people's faces given only their name and access to the ML model. We also initiate experimental exploration of natural countermeasures, investigating a privacy-aware decision tree training algorithm that is a simple variant of CART learning, as well as revealing only rounded confidence values. The lesson that emerges is that one can avoid these kinds of MI attacks with negligible degradation to utility.

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Crossref · 10.1145/2810103.2813677

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  • Privacy and security risks can be significantly reduced by restricting training data to device side, avoiding privacy issues from uploading training data to cloud.

    “Privacy and security risks can be significantly reduced by restricting the training data to only the device side, and thus avoiding the privacy issues as in [195], incurred by uploading training data to the cloud.”

    From Convergence of Edge Computing and Deep Learning: A Comprehensive Survey (2020) · cites this paper as [195]

    The Introduction describes cloud ML services to which customers upload datasets and warns that providers could expose sensitive training data through insider attacks or system compromises. It does not evaluate keeping training data on devices or establish that doing so significantly reduces privacy and security risks; its ML APIs section also describes confidentiality risks when attackers cannot access the training data directly. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Model inversion or reconstruction attacks can cause catastrophic data leakage: images can be reconstructed with impressive accuracy and detail, allowing visualization of the original training data.

    “Such model inversion or reconstruction attacks can cause catastrophic data leakage: it has been shown that images can be reconstructed with impressive accuracy and detail 55 , allowing visualization of the original training data.”

    From Secure, privacy-preserving and federated machine learning in medical imaging (2020) · cites this paper as [55]

    The Summary and Conclusion report extracting recognizable images of training subjects from facial-recognition models. Section 5.2.2 reports sharp, recognizable features for the best-performing model, but says other reconstructions were faint or blurry; the paper does not establish accurate, detailed recovery of the original training images themselves. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • In model inversion attacks, attackers aim to reconstruct the training data using their ability to constantly query the model.

    “In this attack, attackers aim to reconstruct the training data using their ability to constantly query the model [84];”

    From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [84]

    The Summary and Section 5.2 describe model inversion attacks that use model access to infer sensitive features or reconstruct recognizable faces of people represented in the training set. The ML APIs section confirms that attackers can make prediction queries. But the paper does not establish that these attacks reconstruct the training data as a whole or recover exact training records; its face reconstructions are approximations. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Personal information can be purposely obtained from training data by exploiting privacy leaking of a trained classifier.

    “For example, in [195], personal information can be purposely obtained from training data by making use of the privacy leaking of a trained classifier.”
  • Baumhauer et al. [56] use a model inversion attack to evaluate verifiability.

    “In addition, they use a model inversion attack to evaluate verifiability [6].”

    From Machine Unlearning: A Survey (2024) · cites this paper as [6]

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Authors
Fredrikson, M., Jha, S., & Ristenpart, T.
Affiliations
  • Carnegie Mellon University (US)
  • University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
  • Cornell Tech (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2015-10-12
Pages
1322-1333
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2051267297
Cited by
2,961
References
27
Citations by year
2026: 256 · 2025: 389 · 2024: 427 · 2023: 459 · 2022: 374 · 2021: 423 · 2020: 315 · 2019: 190 · 2018: 85 · 2017: 31 · 2016: 11 · 2012: 1
FWCI
23.55
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (FA8650-10-C-7088)
  • National Science Foundation (CNS-1546033 CNS-1330308 CNS-1065134)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
model inversion attacks, confidence scores, privacy attacks on machine learning, decision tree, artificial neural networks, face recognition, lifestyle survey, machine learning as a service, CART, genetic privacy, countermeasures

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