‘Autism and the good life’: a new approach to the study of well-being
Open accessAbstract
Medical, psychological, educational and social interventions to modify the behaviour of autistic people are only justified if they confer benefit on those people. However, it is not clear how 'benefit' should be understood. Most such interventions are justified by referring to the prospect that they will effect lasting improvements in the well-being and happiness of autistic people, so they can lead good lives. What does a good life for an autistic person consist in? Can we assume that his or her well-being is substantively the same as the well-being of non-autistic individuals? In this paper, we argue that, as it stands, the current approach to the study of well-being is for the most part unable to answer these questions. In particular, much effort is needed in order to improve the epistemology of well-being, especially so if we wish this epistemology to be 'autism-sensitive'. Towards the end of the paper, we sketch a new, autism-sensitive approach and apply it in order to begin answering our initial questions.
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Dominant conceptions of the good life, including flourishing, typically rely on species-typical intuitions regarding what is good or desirable, and so encounter a methodological issue when tasked with accounting for neurodivergent modes of flourishing grounded in atypical intuitions.
“Their point is that dominant conceptions of the good life, including of flourishing, typically rely on species-typical intuitions regarding what is good or desirable, and so encounter a methodological issue when tasked with accounting for neurodivergent modes of flourishing that may be grounded in atypical intuitions.”
From Neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, and the good human life (2022) · cites this paper as Rodogno et al., 2016
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Leadbitter, K., Buckle, K. L., Ellis, C., & Dekker, M. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.635690 · Cited by 417 · see citing works
Neurodiversity and the social ecology of mental functions
Chapman, R. (2021) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620959833 · Cited by 267 · see citing works
Neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, and the good human life
Chapman, R., & Carel, H. (2022) · Journal of Social Philosophy · doi:10.1111/josp.12456 · Cited by 231 · see citing works
Gendron, M., Mesquita, B., & Barrett, L. F. (2020) · Culture, Mind, and Brain · doi:10.1017/9781108695374.010 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
- Authors
- Rodogno, R., Krause-Jensen, K., & Ashcroft, R. E.
- Affiliations
- Aarhus University (DK)
- Queen Mary University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Rodogno, Raffaele
- Venue
- Journal of Medical Ethics
- Publisher
- BMJ
- Published
- 2016-05-12
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 401-408
- ISSN
- 0306-6800 (ISSN-L)
- 1473-4257
- OpenAlex
- W2385611587
- Cited by
- 100
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 18.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- pure.au.dk
- Locations
- Journal of Medical Ethics (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- Queen Mary Research Online (Queen Mary University of London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Psychological Well-being and Life Satisfaction
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Autism Spectrum Disorder Research
- Keywords
- autism spectrum disorder, well-being, good life, justification of intervention, happiness
- MeSH terms
- Autistic Disorder, Behavior Therapy, Humans, Quality of Life, Research, Knowledge, Beneficence
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