Expected utility and approval voting
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Approval voting is concerned with the decision behavior of organizations and societal systems. As with other voting procedures, it elicits and converts input from voters into a social decision. Under approval voting, each voter in a multicandidate election can vote for as many candidates as he wishes. The candidate with the most votes is elected. Approval voting is analyzed here from the viewpoint of expected utility maximizing voters. Approximately optimal voting strategies are developed. The relative abilities of votes for different numbers of candidates to affect the outcome are assessed, and the issue of equity among voters is addressed. It is argued that approval voting is more equitable than the common plurality voting system.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Approval voting is particularly useful for efficiently identifying the most acceptable choice [37], as it has been deemed the most “sincere and strategy proof” form of voting [38].”
From A refined compilation of implementation strategies: results from the Expert Recommendations for Implementing Change (ERIC) project (2015) · cites this paper as [37]
Citations
Cites
The Theory of Committees and Elections.
Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
Condorcet Social Choice Functions
Fishburn, P. C. (1977) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0133030 · Cited by 566
Self-citationAggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
Smith, J. H. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914033 · Cited by 494
Social Choice Scoring Functions
Young, H. P. (1975) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0128067 · Cited by 450
Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (1978) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1955105 · Cited by 446
Self-citationAggregation and revelation of preferences
Laffont, J. (1979) · Toulouse Capitole Publications (University Toulouse 1 Capitole) · Cited by 433
An analysis of simple two-stage voting systems
Fishburn, P. C., & Gehrlein, W. V. (1976) · Systems Research and Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830210102 · Cited by 81
Self-citationChamberlin, J. R., & Cohen, M. D. (1978) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1954543 · Cited by 49
A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems
Fishburn, P. C. (1978) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0135040 · Cited by 32
Self-citationApproval Voting: A ‘Best Buy’ Method for Multi-candidate Elections?
Merrill, S. (1979) · Mathematics Magazine · doi:10.1080/0025570x.1979.11976760 · Cited by 28
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Comparison voting. Washington, D.C.: The American Political Science Association, 1978.
- Merrill, 1979, Mathematics Magazine, 52, 98
Cited by
Powell, B. J., Waltz, T. J., Chinman, M. J., Damschroder, L. J., Smith, J. L., Matthieu, M. M., Proctor, E. K., & Kirchner, J. E. (2015) · Implementation Science · doi:10.1186/s13012-015-0209-1 · Cited by 4,963
“Approval voting is particularly useful for efficiently identifying the most acceptable choice [37], as it has been deemed the most “sincere and strategy proof” form of voting [38].”
BackgroundBrams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (2002) · Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1016/s1574-0110(02)80008-x · Cited by 230
Self-citationExpert recommendations for implementing change (ERIC): protocol for a mixed methods study
Waltz, T. J., Powell, B. J., Chinman, M. J., Smith, J. L., Matthieu, M. M., Proctor, E. K., Damschroder, L. J., & Kirchner, J. E. (2014) · Implementation Science · doi:10.1186/1748-5908-9-39 · Cited by 202
“Approval voting is useful for efficiently identifying the most acceptable choice [65], and it also allows for the characterization of approval for the original definitions from Powell et al.”
BackgroundVoting Procedures: A Summary Analysis
Nurmi, H. (1983) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400003215 · Cited by 144
A Pragmatic Method for Evaluating Election Schemes through Simulation
Bordley, R. F. (1983) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956015 · Cited by 44
Metadata
- Authors
- Fishburn, P. C., & Brams, S. J.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- ORCID
- Brams, Steven J.
- Venue
- Behavioral Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1981-04
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 136-142
- ISSN
- 1092-7026 (ISSN-L)
- 0005-7940
- 1099-1743
- OpenAlex
- W2039914285
- Cited by
- 20
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2015: 2 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 15.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 12571 d)
- Locations
- Systems Research and Behavioral Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Keywords
- approval voting, expected utility, voting strategy, multi-candidate elections, plurality voting, social decision-making
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Expected utility and approval voting. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1002/bs.3830260206
- The paper
- Fishburn, P. C., & Brams, S. J. (1981). Expected utility and approval voting. Behavioral Science. https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830260206
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.