The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Condorcet Social Choice Functions
Abstract
A Condorcet social choice function elects the candidate that beats every other candidate under simple majority when such a candidate exists. Various extensions of Condorcet’s simple majority principle that deal with situations that have no simple majority winner have been proposed.Nine Condorcet social choice functions are analyzed and compared on the basis of how well they satisfy a number of conditions for social choice functions. The conditions include several generalizations of Condorcet’s Principle. Remarks on the relative merits of the nine basic functions are included.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Theory of Committees and Elections.
Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Myint, H., & Sen, A. (1972) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913866 · Cited by 2,565
Social Choice and Individual Values
Little, I. M. D. (1952) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257276 · Cited by 1,760
Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix
Condorcet, N. D. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139923972 · Cited by 1,417
Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs.
Abelson, R. P., Harary, F., Norman, R. Z., & Cartwright, D. (1966) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2282802 · Cited by 1,273
Rational Choice Functions and Orderings
Arrow, K. J. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550390 · Cited by 828
The Theory of Committees and Elections.
Roy, A. D., & Black, D. (1959) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2228021 · Cited by 725
Fishburn, P. C. (2015) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400868339 · Cited by 700
Self-citationSocial Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
Sen, A. (1977) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913287 · Cited by 682
Collective Choice and Social Welfare.
Taylor, M., Sen, A. K., & Pattanaik, P. K. (1972) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2230059 · Cited by 656
Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
Smith, J. H. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914033 · Cited by 494
Cited by
Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
Bartholdi, J., Tovey, C. A., & Trick, M. A. (1989) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/bf00303169 · Cited by 548
A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
Young, H. P., & Levenglick, A. (1978) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0135023 · Cited by 455
Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (1978) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1955105 · Cited by 446
Self-citationElectoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions
Cox, G. W. (1987) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111325 · Cited by 339
French, S. (2002) · Journal of the Operational Research Society · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601380 · Cited by 270
Metadata
- Authors
- Fishburn, P. C.
- Venue
- SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics
- Published
- 1977-11
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 469-489
- ISSN
- 0036-1399 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-712X
- OpenAlex
- W1968498770
- Cited by
- 566
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 24.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.