Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low probabilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“These results are in line with prospect theory, which suggests that people are more sensitive to losses than to gains when making decisions [30].”
From Promoting the Use of Reusable Coffee Cups through Environmental Messaging, the Provision of Alternatives and Financial Incentives (2018) · cites this paper as [30]
In the citing paper
“Human perception and decision-making routinely exhibit robust cognitive biases and heuristics that appear distinctly non-Bayesian, including base-rate neglect, availability bias, and anchoring effects (Kahneman and Tversky 2013; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Kahneman and Tversky 2013
In the citing paper
“This relationship is non-linear and asymmetrical.”
From Uncertainty as a Form of Transparency: Measuring, Communicating, and Using Uncertainty (2021) · cites this paper as [61]
In the citing paper
“When risk is presented positively, e.g., a 95% chance of the model being correct, people tend to be risk-averse; when it is presented negatively they are risk-seeking.”
From Uncertainty as a Form of Transparency: Measuring, Communicating, and Using Uncertainty (2021) · cites this paper as [61]
In the citing paper
“A certain prediction of a large loss is often perceived more negatively than an uncertain prediction of a small loss.”
From Uncertainty as a Form of Transparency: Measuring, Communicating, and Using Uncertainty (2021) · cites this paper as [61]
2 more claims about this paper
Create a free account to see every claim other papers make about this one.
Citations
Cites
Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
Pratt, J. W. (1964) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913738 · Cited by 4,874
The Foundations of Statistics.
Good, I. J., & Savage, L. J. (1955) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2343133 · Cited by 4,582
Allais, M. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907921 · Cited by 4,112
Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing.
Hakansson, N. H., & Arrow, K. J. (1972) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2978877 · Cited by 3,991
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
Hawkins, D. (1945) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/286866 · Cited by 3,887
Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice
Tversky, A. (1972) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0032955 · Cited by 3,365
Self-citationLectures on Functional Equations and their Applications.
Hahn, F., Aczel, J., & Oser, H. (1968) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2314998 · Cited by 2,594
Parducci, A., & Helson, H. (1965) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1421107 · Cited by 2,475
Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs.
Smith, A. F. M., Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. (1977) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2345300 · Cited by 2,305
Intransitivity of preferences.
Tversky, A. (1969) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0026750 · Cited by 2,188
Self-citationDecision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty.
Klevorick, A. K., & Raiffa, H. (1969) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2325714 · Cited by 1,928
Mean-Risk Analysis with Risk Associated with Below-Target Returns
Fishburn, P. C. (1975) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,214
Fishburn, P. C., Suppes, P., Krantz, D. H., Luce, R. D., Tversky, A., Luce, R. D., & Suppes, P. (1991) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2290423 · Cited by 796
Self-citationDisaster insurance protection: Public policy lessons
Kunreuther, H. C. (1978) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 777
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · doi:10.21236/ad0767426 · Cited by 756
Self-citationTopological methods in cardinal utility theory
Debreu, G., Debreu, G., & Hildenbrand, W. (2008) · Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1017/ccol052123736x.010 · Cited by 621
An Experimental Measurement of Utility
Mosteller, F., & Nogee, P. (1951) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257106 · Cited by 485
Utility Theory: Axioms Versus ‘Paradoxes’
MacCrimmon, K. R., & Larsson, S. (1979) · Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7629-1_15 · Cited by 401
TWO‐PIECE VON NEUMANN‐MORGENSTERN UTILITY FUNCTIONS*
Fishburn, P. C., & Kochenberger, G. A. (1979) · Decision Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5915.1979.tb00043.x · Cited by 388
Subjective probabilities inferred from decisions.
Edwards, W. (1962) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0038674 · Cited by 336
Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon
Grether, D. M., & Plott, C. R. (2001) · Information, Finance and General Equilibrium · doi:10.4337/9781035352623.00025 · Cited by 328
Preference for Insuring against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., Lichtenstein, S., Corrigan, B., & Combs, B. (1977) · The Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.2307/252136 · Cited by 318
Additivity, utility, and subjective probability
Tversky, A. (1967) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-2496(67)90049-1 · Cited by 280
Self-citationStability of Choices among Uncertain Alternatives
McGlothlin, W. H. (1956) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1419083 · Cited by 275
Distortion of Subjective Probabilities as a Reaction to Uncertainty
Fellner, W. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884325 · Cited by 232
Decision Making; an Experimental Approach.
Luce, R. D., Davidson, D., Suppes, P., & Siegel, S. (1959) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2022058 · Cited by 167
Information integration in risky decision making.
Anderson, N. H., & Shanteau, J. C. (1970) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0029300 · Cited by 161
PORTFOLIO THEORY AND THE MEASUREMENT OF RISK
Coombs, C. H. (1975) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-397250-7.50009-x · Cited by 153
Decisions Under Uncertainty: Drilling Decisions by Oil and Gas Operators.
Smidt, S., & Grayson, C. J. (1961) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2390745 · Cited by 114
Cross-Modality Matching of Money Against Other Continua
Galanter, E., & Pliner, P. P. (1974) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2245-3_6 · Cited by 89
Attitudes toward Speculative Risks as an Indicator of Attitudes toward Pure Risks
Williams, C. A. (1966) · Journal of Risk & Insurance · doi:10.2307/251231 · Cited by 81
The Development of a Corporate Risk Policy for Capital Investment Decisions
Spetzler, C. S. (1968) · IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics · doi:10.1109/tssc.1968.300122 · Cited by 75
The appropriateness of the expected utility model
Hansson, B. (1975) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/bf00226381 · Cited by 33
Lew, E. A., & Stenlund, J. C. (1970) · Cited by 32
A measurement axiomatization for an essentially multiplicative representation of two factors
Roskies, R. Z. (1965) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-2496(65)90005-2 · Cited by 28
From Bismark to Woodcock: The "Irrational" Pursuit of National Health Insurance
Fuchs, V. R. (1976) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0120 · Cited by 27
COMPARING IMPUTED AND ACTUAL UTILITY FUNCTIONS IN A COMPETITIVE BIDDING SETTING
Barnes, J. D., & Reinmuth, J. E. (1976) · Decision Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5915.1976.tb00720.x · Cited by 20
Probability and Profit. A Study of Economic Behavior Along Bayesian Lines.
Whitaker, J. K., & Fellner, W. J. (1966) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2229048 · Cited by 13
Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1974) · PsycEXTRA Dataset · doi:10.1037/e457842004-001 · Cited by 11
Self-citation
Cited by
A Survey of Fake News: Fundamental Theories, Detection Methods, and Opportunities
Zhou, X., & Zafarani, R. (2021) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3395046 · Cited by 1,184
“[Frijda 1986] 109:7 news often intentionally and are driven by benefits [Hovland et al. 1957; Kahneman and Tversky 2013].”
BackgroundOnline Investors: Do the Slow Die First?
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2002) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/15.2.455 · Cited by 784
Simonson, I., & Nowlis, S. M. (2000) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/314308 · Cited by 531
Focusing on the Forgone: How Value Can Appear So Different to Buyers and Sellers
Carmon, Z., & Ariely, D. (2000) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/317590 · Cited by 482
Beyond the Precautionary Principle
Sunstein, C. R. (2003) · University of Pennsylvania Law Review · doi:10.2307/3312884 · Cited by 430
Metadata
- Authors
- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A.
- Venue
- World Scientific Handbook in Financial Economics Series
- Publisher
- WORLD SCIENTIFIC
- Published
- 2013-06-11
- Pages
- 99-127
- ISSN
- 2010-1732 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W33891176
- Cited by
- 3,091
- References
- 39
- Citations by year
- 2026: 283 · 2025: 469 · 2024: 468 · 2023: 473 · 2022: 333 · 2021: 278 · 2020: 253 · 2019: 201 · 2018: 129 · 2017: 36 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 17
- FWCI
- 24.83
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- World Scientific handbook in financial economic series (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
- Keywords
- prospect theory, expected utility theory, decision making under risk, certainty effect, isolation effect, risk aversion, risk seeking, loss aversion, value function, probability weighting, gambling, behavioral economics
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.