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Cited by 368

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Political Economy of Administered Protection

FINGER, J. M., HALL, H. KEITH, NELSON, DOUGLAS R. · 2014 · World Scientific Studies in International Economics

Abstract

Trade restrictions are hardly ever voted directly by Congress. Though the threat of direct congressional action is frequently present, pressure for protection is usually applied through the major instruments for the administrative regulation of imports: the antidumping and countervailing duty procedures and the escape clause mechanism. In this paper, we will examine these instruments for the administrative regulation of imports. The form of the paper is not novel -a theory of how these mechanisms work is developed, then operational implications of this theory are deduced and tested over the record of countervailing duty, antidumping, and escape clause cases decided from 1975 through 1979. This is the period over which the Trade Act of 1974 was in force. Because the nature of these mechanisms is relatively unfamiliar, a relatively large amount of institutional information is provided.'

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Metadata

Authors
FINGER, J. M., HALL, H. K., & NELSON, D. R.
Venue
World Scientific Studies in International Economics
Published
2014-04
Pages
3-17
ISSN
1793-3641 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1592946066
Cited by
368
References
3
FWCI
37.99
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Political Economy of Administered Protection. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1142/9789814452519_0001
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FINGER, J. M., HALL, H. K., & NELSON, D. R. (2014). The Political Economy of Administered Protection. World Scientific Studies in International Economics. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814452519_0001

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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