Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 307

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

MORE SPATIAL GAMES

NOWAK, MARTIN A., BONHOEFFER, SEBASTIAN, MAY, ROBERT M.·1994·International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos

Abstract

We extend our exploration of the dynamics of spatial evolutionary games [Nowak & May 1992, 1993] in three distinct but related ways. We analyse, first, deterministic versus stochastic rules; second, discrete versus continuous time (see Hubermann & Glance [1993]); and, third, different geometries of interaction in regular and random spatial arrays. We show that spatial effects can change some of the intuitive concepts in evolutionary game theory: (i) equilibria among strategies are no longer necessarily characterised by equal average payoffs; (ii) the strategy with the higher average payoff can steadily converge towards extinction; (iii) strategies can become extinct even though their basic reproductive rate (at very low frequencies) is larger than one. The equilibrium properties of spatial games are instead determined by “local relative payoffs.” We characterise the conditions for coexistence between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that cooperation can be maintained if the transition rules give more weight to the most successful neighbours, or if there is a certain probability that cells may remain unoccupied in the next generations when they are surrounded by players with low payoffs. In this second case the cooperators can survive despite a very large payoff advantage to defectors. We also compute average extinction times for random drift in neutral spatial models. Finally we briefly describe the spatial dynamics of an interaction among three species which dominate each other in a cyclic fashion. The emphasis of this paper is presenting a variety of ideas and possibilities for further research in the evolutionary dynamics of spatial games. The overall conclusion is that interactions with local neighbours in 2- or 3-dimensional spatial arrays can promote coexistence of different strategies (such as cooperators and defectors in the Prisoner’s Dilemma), in situations where one strategy would exclude all others if the interactions occurred randomly and homogeneously.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1142/s0218127494000046

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 307

Metadata

Authors
NOWAK, M. A., BONHOEFFER, S., & MAY, R. M.
Venue
International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos
Published
1994-02
Volume
04
Issue
01
Pages
33-56
ISSN
  • 0218-1274 (ISSN-L)
  • 1793-6551
OpenAlex
W2092033088
Cited by
307
References
0
FWCI
16.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: MORE SPATIAL GAMES. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1142/s0218127494000046
The paper
NOWAK, M. A., BONHOEFFER, S., & MAY, R. M. (1994). MORE SPATIAL GAMES. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos. https://doi.org/10.1142/s0218127494000046

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.