The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
OPTIMAL PAYOFF FUNCTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF COLLECTIVES
Abstract
We consider the problem of designing (perhaps massively distributed) collectives of computational processes to maximize a provided "world utility" function. We consider this problem when the behavior of each process in the collective can be cast as striving to maximize its own payoff utility function. For such cases the central design issue is how to initialize/update those payoff utility functions of the individual processes so as to induce behavior of the entire collective having good values of the world utility. Traditional "team game" approaches to this problem simply assign to each process the world utility as its payoff utility function. In previous work we used the "Collective Intelligence" (COIN) framework to derive a better choice of payoff utility functions, one that results in world utility performance up to orders of magnitude superior to that ensuing from the use of the team game utility. In this paper, we extend these results using a novel mathematical framework. Under that new framework we review the derivation of the general class of payoff utility functions that both (i) are easy for the individual processes to try to maximize, and (ii) have the property that if good values of them are achieved, then we are assured a high value of world utility. These are the "Aristocrat Utility" and a new variant of the "Wonderful Life Utility" that was introduced in the previous COIN work. We demonstrate experimentally that using these new utility functions can result in significantly improved performance over that of previously investigated COIN payoff utilities, over and above those previous utilities' superiority to the conventional team game utility. These results also illustrate the substantial superiority of these payoff functions to perhaps the most natural version of the economics technique of "endogenizing externalities."
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Cites
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Foerster, J., Farquhar, G., Afouras, T., Nardelli, N., & Whiteson, S. (2018) · Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11794 · Cited by 1,873
Cooperative Multi-Agent Learning: The State of the Art
Panait, L., & Luke, S. (2005) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-005-2631-2 · Cited by 1,237
A survey and critique of multiagent deep reinforcement learning
Hernandez-Leal, P., Kartal, B., & Taylor, M. E. (2019) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-019-09421-1 · Cited by 671
Matignon, L., Laurent, G. J., & Le Fort-Piat, N. (2012) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888912000057 · Cited by 415
Charbonnier, F., Morstyn, T., & McCulloch, M. D. (2022) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2022.118825 · Cited by 78
“The difference in total instant rewards r between that if agent i selects the greedy action and that if it selects the default action is used to update Q [61].”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- WOLPERT, D. H., & TUMER, K.
- Venue
- Advances in Complex Systems
- Publisher
- World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt
- Published
- 2001-06
- Volume
- 04
- Issue
- 02n03
- Pages
- 265-279
- ISSN
- 0219-5259 (ISSN-L)
- 1793-6802
- OpenAlex
- W2161061197
- Cited by
- 206
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 13.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- WOLPERT, D. H., & TUMER, K. (2001). OPTIMAL PAYOFF FUNCTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF COLLECTIVES. Advances in Complex Systems. https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219525901000188
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