Cited by 218Security and Verification in ComputingUser Authentication and Security SystemsAdvanced Authentication Protocols Security

Moderately hard, memory-bound functions

Abadi, Martin, Burrows, Mike, Manasse, Mark, Wobber, Ted·2005·ACM Transactions on Internet Technology

Abstract

A resource may be abused if its users incur little or no cost. For example, e-mail abuse is rampant because sending an e-mail has negligible cost for the sender. It has been suggested that such abuse may be discouraged by introducing an artificial cost in the form of a moderately expensive computation. Thus, the sender of an e-mail might be required to pay by computing for a few seconds before the e-mail is accepted. Unfortunately, because of sharp disparities across computer systems, this approach may be ineffective against malicious users with high-end systems, prohibitively slow for legitimate users with low-end systems, or both. Starting from this observation, we research moderately hard functions that most recent systems will evaluate at about the same speed. For this purpose, we rely on memory-bound computations. We describe and analyze a family of moderately hard, memory-bound functions, and we explain how to use them for protecting against abuses.

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Crossref · 10.1145/1064340.1064341

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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • The paper provides a verifiable data deletion or expunge protocol based on memory-hard functions that does not exploit any trusted party to execute verification.

    “A verifiable data deletion/expunge protocol based on memoryhard functions [6, 18, 19] (§5.2 and §5.3), which do not exploit any trusted-party to execute verification.”

    From IoT Expunge: Implementing Verifiable Retention of IoT Data (2020) · cites this paper as [6]

  • The paper proposes to use memory-hard functions to delete encrypted sensor data at the cloud during the state transition phase.

    “We propose to use memory-hard functions [6, 13, 18, 19] to delete encrypted sensor data at the cloud, during state transition phase.”

    From IoT Expunge: Implementing Verifiable Retention of IoT Data (2020) · cites this paper as [6]

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Authors
Abadi, M., Burrows, M., Manasse, M., & Wobber, T.
Affiliations
  • University of California at Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA
  • Google (United States) (US)
  • Microsoft (United States) (US)
Venue
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology
Published
2005-05
Volume
5
Issue
2
Pages
299-327
ISSN
  • 1533-5399 (ISSN-L)
  • 1557-6051
OpenAlex
W1998350371
Cited by
218
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 15
FWCI
19.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
Keywords
abuse prevention, computational cost, cryptographic functions

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