The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Design and verification of secure systems
Abstract
This paper reviews some of the difficulties that arise in the verification of kernelized secure systems and suggests new techniques for their resolution. It is proposed that secure systems should be conceived as distributed systems in which security is achieved partly through the physical separation of its individual components and partly through the mediation of trusted functions performed within some of those components. The purpose of a security kernel is simply to allow such a 'distributed' system to actually run within a single processor; policy enforcement is not the concern of a security kernel. This approach decouples verification of components which perform trusted functions from verification of the security kernel. This latter task may be accomplished by a new verification technique called 'proof of separability' which explicitly addresses the security relevant aspects of interrupt handling and other issues ignored by present methods.
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Citations
Cites
Secure Computer System: Unified Exposition and Multics Interpretation
Bell, D. E., & La Padula, L. J. (1976) · doi:10.21236/ada023588 · Cited by 1,916
A note on the confinement problem
Lampson, B. W. (1973) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/362375.362389 · Cited by 1,429
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Denning, D. E., & Denning, P. J. (1977) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359636.359712 · Cited by 1,029
Proof of correctness of data representations
Hoare, C. A. R. (1972) · Acta Informatica · doi:10.1007/bf00289507 · Cited by 966
Tupac, J. D. (1963) · Spartan Books · Cited by 530
Specification and verification of the UCLA Unix security kernel
Walker, B. J., Kemmerer, R. A., & Popek, G. J. (1980) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/358818.358825 · Cited by 152
A comment on the confinement problem
Lipner, S. B. (1975) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/1067629.806537 · Cited by 123
Proof of separability A verification technique for a class of security kernels
Rushby, J. (1982) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/3-540-11494-7_23 · Cited by 97
Self-citationKSOS—The design of a secure operating system
McCauley, E. J., & Drongowski, P. J. (1979) · International Workshop on Managing Requirements Knowledge (MARK) · doi:10.1109/mark.1979.8817190 · Cited by 69
Gold, B. D., Linde, R. R., Peeler, R. J., Schaefer, M., Scheid, J. F., & Ward, P. (1979) · International Workshop on Managing Requirements Knowledge (MARK) · doi:10.1109/mark.1979.8817181 · Cited by 45
Popek, G. J., Kampe, M., Kline, C. S., Stoughton, A., URBAN, M., & Walton, E. (1979) · International Workshop on Managing Requirements Knowledge (MARK) · doi:10.1109/mark.1979.8817171 · Cited by 37
KSOS—Development methodology for a secure operating system
Berson, T. A., & Barksdale, G. L. (1979) · International Workshop on Managing Requirements Knowledge (MARK) · doi:10.1109/mark.1979.8817195 · Cited by 31
Popek, G. J., & Kline, C. S. (1978) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/3-540-08755-9_5 · Cited by 23
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Singularity: Scientific containers for mobility of compute
Kurtzer, G. M., Sochat, V., & Bauer, M. W. (2017) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0177459 · Cited by 2,740
Klein, G., Elphinstone, K., Heiser, G., Andronick, J., Cock, D., Derrin, P., Elkaduwe, D., Engelhardt, K., Kolanski, R., Norrish, M., et al. (2009) · Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 22nd symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/1629575.1629596 · Cited by 1,633
Trusted Execution Environment: What It is, and What It is Not
Sabt, M., Achemlal, M., & Bouabdallah, A. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA · doi:10.1109/trustcom.2015.357 · Cited by 724
Wahab, O. A., Mourad, A., Otrok, H., & Taleb, T. (2021) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2021.3058573 · Cited by 487
Scale and performance in the Denali isolation kernel
Whitaker, A., Shaw, M., & Gribble, S. D. (2002) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/844128.844147 · Cited by 377
Metadata
- Authors
- Rushby, J. M.
- Venue
- ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
- Published
- 1981-12
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 12-21
- ISSN
- 0163-5980 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2150210903
- Cited by
- 364
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 2.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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