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Cited by 269

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Sybilproof reputation mechanisms

Open access
Cheng, Alice, Friedman, Eric·2005·Proceeding of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems - P2PECON '05

Abstract

Due to the open, anonymous nature of many P2P networks, new identities - or sybils - may be created cheaply and in large numbers. Given a reputation system, a peer may attempt to falsely raise its reputation by creating fake links between its sybils. Many existing reputation mechanisms are not resistant to these types of strategies.Using a static graph formulation of reputation, we attempt to formalize the notion of sybilproofness. We show that there is no symmetric sybilproof reputation function. For nonsymmetric reputations, following the notion of reputation propagation along paths, we give a general asymmetric reputation function based on flow and give conditions for sybilproofness.

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Metadata

Authors
Cheng, A., & Friedman, E.
Venue
Proceeding of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems - P2PECON '05
Publisher
ACM Press
Published
2005
Pages
128
OpenAlex
W2110519146
Cited by
269
References
9
FWCI
44.52
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
gold

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Sybilproof reputation mechanisms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/1080192.1080202
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Cheng, A., & Friedman, E. (2005). Sybilproof reputation mechanisms. Proceeding of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems - P2PECON '05. https://doi.org/10.1145/1080192.1080202

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.