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Cited by 558

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks

Feldman, Michal, Lai, Kevin, Stoica, Ion, Chuang, John·2004·Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Abstract

Lack of cooperation (free riding) is one of the key problems that confronts today's P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems pose: large populations, high turnover, a symmetry of interest, collusion, zero-cost identities, and traitors. To tackle these challenges we model the P2P system using the Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma (GPD),and propose the Reciprocative decision function as the basis of a family of incentives techniques. These techniques are fullydistributed and include: discriminating server selection, maxflow-based subjective reputation, and adaptive stranger policies. Through simulation, we show that these techniques can drive a system of strategic users to nearly optimal levels of cooperation.

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Metadata

Authors
Feldman, M., Lai, K., Stoica, I., & Chuang, J.
Venue
Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Publisher
ACM
Published
2004-05-17
Pages
102-111
OpenAlex
W2100642498
Cited by
558
References
3
FWCI
23.47
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/988772.988788
The paper
Feldman, M., Lai, K., Stoica, I., & Chuang, J. (2004). Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks. Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce. https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988788

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.