The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Control-flow integrity
Abstract
Current software attacks often build on exploits that subvert machine-code execution. The enforcement of a basic safety property, Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), can prevent such attacks from arbitrarily controlling program behavior. CFI enforcement is simple, and its guarantees can be established formally even with respect to powerful adversaries. Moreover, CFI enforcement is practical: it is compatible with existing software and can be done efficiently using software rewriting in commodity systems. Finally, CFI provides a useful foundation for enforcing further security policies, as we demonstrate with efficient software implementations of a protected shadow call stack and of access control for memory regions.
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Citations
Cites
Necula, G. C. (1997) · Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages - POPL '97 · doi:10.1145/263699.263712 · Cited by 1,843
Cited by
(2021) · doi:10.1109/tse.2019.2946563 · Cited by 574
Vigilante: end-to-end containment of internet worms
Costa, M., Crowcroft, J., Castro, M., Rowstron, A., Zhou, L., Zhang, L., & Barham, P. (2005) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/1095809.1095824 · Cited by 441
Le Goues, C., Pradel, M., & Roychoudhury, A. (2019) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3318162 · Cited by 410
ROPecker: A Generic and Practical Approach For Defending Against ROP Attacks
Cheng, Y., Zhou, Z., Yu, M., Ding, X., & Deng, R. H. (2014) · Proceedings 2014 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2014.23156 · Cited by 279
What You Corrupt Is Not What You Crash: Challenges in Fuzzing Embedded Devices
Muench, M., Stijohann, J., Kargl, F., Francillon, A., & Balzarotti, D. (2018) · Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2018.23166 · Cited by 219
Metadata
- Authors
- Abadi, M., Budiu, M., Erlingsson, Ú., & Ligatti, J.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2005-11-07
- Pages
- 340-353
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2109219878
- Cited by
- 1,032
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 14.55
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Abadi, M., Budiu, M., Erlingsson, Ú., & Ligatti, J. (2005). Control-flow integrity. Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. https://doi.org/10.1145/1102120.1102165
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
