The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Understanding the network-level behavior of spammers
Abstract
This paper studies the network-level behavior of spammers, including: IP address ranges that send the most spam, common spamming modes (e.g., BGP route hijacking, bots), how persistent across time each spamming host is, and characteristics of spamming botnets. We try to answer these questions by analyzing a 17-month trace of over 10 million spam messages collected at an Internet "spam sinkhole", and by correlating this data with the results of IP-based blacklist lookups, passive TCP fingerprinting information, routing information, and botnet "command and control" traces.We find that most spam is being sent from a few regions of IP address space, and that spammers appear to be using transient "bots" that send only a few pieces of email over very short periods of time. Finally, a small, yet non-negligible, amount of spam is received from IP addresses that correspond to short-lived BGP routes, typically for hijacked prefixes. These trends suggest that developing algorithms to identify botnet membership, filtering email messages based on network-leve l properties (which are less variable than email content), and improving the security of the Internet routing infrastructure, may prove to be extremely effective for combating spam.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
How to Own the Internet in Your Spare Time
Staniford, S., Paxson, V., & Weaver, N. C. (2002) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 1,169
Code-Red: a case study on the spread and victims of an internet worm
Moore, D., Shannon, C., & claffy, K. (2002) · Proceedings of the second ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet measurment - IMW '02 · doi:10.1145/637201.637244 · Cited by 787
Understanding BGP misconfiguration
Mahajan, R., Wetherall, D., & Anderson, T. (2002) · Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications · doi:10.1145/633025.633027 · Cited by 533
An empirical study of spam traffic and the use of DNS black lists
Jung, J., & Sit, E. (2004) · ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) · doi:10.1145/1028788.1028838 · Cited by 186
Measuring the effects of internet path faults on reactive routing
Feamster, N., Andersen, D. G., Balakrishnan, H., & Kaashoek, M. F. (2003) · Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems · doi:10.1145/781027.781043 · Cited by 168
Self-citationPrince, M. B., Dahl, B. M., Holloway, L., Keller, A. M., & Langheinrich, E. (2005) · Conference on Email and Anti-Spam · Cited by 60
An empirical study of "bogon" route advertisements
Feamster, N., Jung, J., & Balakrishnan, H. (2005) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/1052812.1052826 · Cited by 34
Self-citationIP Addresses in Email Clients.
Goodman, J. (2004) · Cited by 23
Cited by
SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks
Yu, H., Kaminsky, M., Gibbons, P. B., & Flaxman, A. (2006) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/1151659.1159945 · Cited by 725
Your botnet is my botnet: analysis of a botnet takeover
Stone-Gross, B., Cova, M., Cavallaro, L., Gilbert, B., Szydlowski, M., Kemmerer, R., Kruegel, C., & Vigna, G. (2009) · Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1653662.1653738 · Cited by 577
SybilLimit: A Near-Optimal Social Network Defense against Sybil Attacks
Yu, H., Gibbons, P. B., Kaminsky, M., & Xiao, F. (2008) · 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008) · doi:10.1109/sp.2008.13 · Cited by 563
An Overview of IP Flow-Based Intrusion Detection
Sperotto, A., Schaffrath, G., Sadre, R., Morariu, C., Pras, A., & Stiller, B. (2010) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2010.032210.00054 · Cited by 466
A survey of learning-based techniques of email spam filtering
Blanzieri, E., & Bryl, A. (2008) · Artificial Intelligence Review · doi:10.1007/s10462-009-9109-6 · Cited by 407
Metadata
- Authors
- Ramachandran, A., & Feamster, N.
- Venue
- ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
- Published
- 2006-08-11
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 291-302
- ISSN
- 0146-4833 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2113344319
- Cited by
- 510
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 147.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.