The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Revisiting the uniqueness of simple demographics in the US population
Abstract
According to a famous study [10] of the 1990 census data, 87% of the US population can be uniquely identified by gender, ZIP code and full date of birth. This short paper revisits the uniqueness of simple demographics in the US population based on the most recent census data (the 2000 census). We offer a detailed, comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the threat to privacy posed by the disclosure of simple demographic information. Our results generally agree with the findings of [10], although we find that disclosing one's gender, ZIP code and full date of birth allows for unique identification of fewer individuals (63% of the US population) than reported in [10]. We hope that our study will be a useful reference for privacy researchers who need simple estimates of the comparative threat of disclosing various demographic data.
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Citations
Cites
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“The study further reported that 53% of the U.S. population is uniquely identi.ed only by {gender, place, date of birth}, where place is basically the city, town, or municipality in which the person Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom…”
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Cited by
Estimating the success of re-identifications in incomplete datasets using generative models
Rocher, L., Hendrickx, J. M., & de Montjoye, Y.-A. (2019) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-019-10933-3 · Cited by 816
“We train our model on the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) fi les using ZIP code, date of birth, and gender and validate it using the last national estimate 50 .”
MethodRoutes for breaching and protecting genetic privacy
Erlich, Y., & Narayanan, A. (2014) · Nature Reviews Genetics · doi:10.1038/nrg3723 · Cited by 458
A Systematic Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health Data
El Emam, K., Jonker, E., Arbuckle, L., & Malin, B. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028071 · Cited by 427
Anonymization of location data does not work: a large-scale measurement study
Zang, H., & Bolot, J. (2011) · Proceedings of the 17th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking · doi:10.1145/2030613.2030630 · Cited by 362
Evaluating re-identification risks with respect to the HIPAA privacy rule
Benitez, K., & Malin, B. (2010) · Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association · doi:10.1136/jamia.2009.000026 · Cited by 301
Metadata
- Authors
- Golle, P.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2006-10-30
- Pages
- 77-80
- OpenAlex
- W2083680779
- Cited by
- 254
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 2.88
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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