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Evading network anomaly detection systems: formal reasoning and practical techniques

Fogla, Prahlad, Lee, Wenke · 2006 · Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cited by 157

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Attackers often try to evade an intrusion detection system (IDS) when launching their attacks. There have been several published studies in evasion attacks, some with available tools, in the research community as well as the "hackers'' community. Our recent empirical case study showed that some payload-based network anomaly detection systems can be evaded by a polymorphic blending attack (PBA). The main idea of a PBA is to create each polymorphic instance in such a way that the statistics of attack packet(s) match the normal traffic profile. In this paper, we present a formal framework for the open problem: given an anomaly detection system and an attack, can one automatically generate its PBA instances? We show that in general, generating a PBA that optimally matches the normal traffic profile is a hard problem (NP-complete). However, the problem of finding a PBA can be reduced to the SAT or ILP problems so that solvers available in those domains can be used to find a near-optimal solution. We also present a heuristic (hill-climbing) to find an approximate solution. Our framework can not only expose how the IDS can be exploited by a PBA but also suggest how the IDS can be improved to prevent the PBA. We have experimented with our framework using the PAYL 1-gram and 2-gram anomaly detection system, and the results have validated our framework.

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Crossref · 10.1145/1180405.1180414

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Metadata

Authors
Fogla, P., & Lee, W.
Venue
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2006-10-30
Pages
59-68
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2032247543
Cited by
157
References
1
FWCI
7.69
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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