New cache designs for thwarting software cache-based side channel attacks
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Software cache-based side channel attacks are a serious new class of threats for computers. Unlike physical side channel attacks that mostly target embedded cryptographic devices, cache-based side channel attacks can also undermine general purpose systems. The attacks are easy to perform, effective on most platforms, and do not require special instruments or excessive computation power. In recently demonstrated attacks on software implementations of ciphers like AES and RSA, the full key can be recovered by an unprivileged user program performing simple timing measurements based on cache misses.
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Cites
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Cited by
Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical
Liu, F., Yarom, Y., Ge, Q., Heiser, G., & Lee, R. B. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.43 · Cited by 1,009
Self-citationSecurity and Privacy in Cloud Computing
Xiao, Z., & Xiao, Y. (2013) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2012.060912.00182 · Cited by 596
Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack
Gruss, D., Maurice, C., Wagner, K., & Mangard, S. (2016) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-40667-1_14 · Cited by 569
CATalyst: Defeating last-level cache side channel attacks in cloud computing
Liu, F., Ge, Q., Yarom, Y., Mckeen, F., Rozas, C., Heiser, G., & Lee, R. B. (2016) · 2016 IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA) · doi:10.1109/hpca.2016.7446082 · Cited by 370
Self-citationA survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware
Ge, Q., Yarom, Y., Cock, D., & Heiser, G. (2018) · Journal of Cryptographic Engineering · doi:10.1007/s13389-016-0141-6 · Cited by 368
Metadata
- Authors
- Wang, Z., & Lee, R. B.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 34th annual international symposium on Computer architecture
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2007-06-09
- Pages
- 494-505
- ISSN
- 1063-6897 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2166293920
- Cited by
- 500
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 6.51
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.