Optimal security hardening using multi-objective optimization on attack tree models of networks
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Researchers have previously looked into the problem of determining if a given set of security hardening measures can effectively make a networked system secure. Many of them also addressed the problem of minimizing the total cost of implementing these hardening measures, given costs for individual measures. However, system administrators are often faced with a more challenging problem since they have to work within a fixed budget which may be less than the minimum cost of system hardening. Their problem is how to select a subset of security hardening measures so as to be within the budget and yet minimize the residual damage to the system caused by not plugging all required security holes. In this work, we develop a systematic approach to solve this problem by formulating it as a multi-objective optimization problem on an attack tree model of the system and then use an evolutionary algorithm to solve it.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundSelf-citation
Cited by
Dynamic Security Risk Management Using Bayesian Attack Graphs
Poolsappasit, N., Dewri, R., & Ray, I. (2012) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2011.34 · Cited by 617
Self-citationDAG-based attack and defense modeling: Don’t miss the forest for the attack trees
Kordy, B., Piètre-Cambacédès, L., & Schweitzer, P. (2014) · Computer Science Review · doi:10.1016/j.cosrev.2014.07.001 · Cited by 321
Identifying Critical Attack Assets in Dependency Attack Graphs
Sawilla, R. E., & Ou, X. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-88313-5_2 · Cited by 164
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MethodXiao, F., Chen, S., Yang, J., He, H., Jiang, X., Tan, X., & Jin, D. (2025) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2024.104180 · Cited by 17
Metadata
- Authors
- Dewri, R., Poolsappasit, N., Ray, I., & Whitley, D.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2007-10-28
- Pages
- 204-213
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2091673436
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 4.12
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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