The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Code injection attacks on harvard-architecture devices
Open accessAbstract
Harvard architecture CPU design is common in the embedded world. Examples of Harvard-based architecture devices are the Mica family of wireless sensors. Mica motes have limited memory and can process only very small packets. Stack-based buffer overflow techniques that inject code into the stack and then execute it are therefore not applicable. It has been a common belief that code injection is impossible on Harvard architectures. This paper presents a remote code injection attack for Mica sensors. We show how to exploit program vulnerabilities to permanently inject any piece of code into the program memory of an Atmel AVR-based sensor. To our knowledge, this is the first result that presents a code injection technique for such devices. Previous work only succeeded in injecting data or performing transient attacks. Injecting permanent code is more powerful since the attacker can gain full control of the target sensor. We also show that this attack can be used to inject a worm that can propagate through the wireless sensor network and possibly create a sensor botnet. Our attack combines different techniques such as return oriented programming and fake stack injection. We present implementation details and suggest some counter-measures.
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Cites
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Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys
Halderman, J. A., Schoen, S. D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paul, W., Calandrino, J. A., Feldman, A. J., Appelbaum, J., & Felten, E. W. (2009) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/1506409.1506429 · Cited by 980
On the effectiveness of address-space randomization
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Transmission of ipv6 packets over ieee 802.15.4 networks
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Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit
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Cited by
Jump-oriented programming: a new class of code-reuse attack
Bletsch, T., Jiang, X., Freeh, V. W., & Liang, Z. (2011) · Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/1966913.1966919 · Cited by 553
Return-oriented programming without returns
Checkoway, S., Davi, L., Dmitrienko, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., Shacham, H., & Winandy, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866370 · Cited by 530
Just-In-Time Code Reuse: On the Effectiveness of Fine-Grained Address Space Layout Randomization
Snow, K. Z., Monrose, F., Davi, L., Dmitrienko, A., Liebchen, C., & Sadeghi, A. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.45 · Cited by 505
Return-Oriented Programming: Systems, Languages, and Applications
Roemer, R., Buchanan, E., Shacham, H., & Savage, S. (2012) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/2133375.2133377 · Cited by 497
TyTAN: tiny trust anchor for tiny devices
Brasser, F., El Mahjoub, B., Sadeghi, A.-R., Wachsmann, C., & Koeberl, P. (2015) · Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Design Automation Conference · doi:10.1145/2744769.2744922 · Cited by 261
Metadata
- Authors
- Francillon, A., & Castelluccia, C.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2008-10-27
- Pages
- 15-26
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2141389113
- Cited by
- 261
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 14.39
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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