Efficient purely-dynamic information flow analysis
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We present a novel approach for efficiently tracking information flow in a dynamically-typed language such as JavaScript. Our approach is purely dynamic, and it detects problems with implicit paths via a dynamic check that avoids the need for an approximate static analyses while still guaranteeing non-interference. We incorporate this check into an efficient evaluation strategy based on sparse information labeling that leaves information flow labels implicit whenever possible, and introduces explicit labels only for values that migrate between security domains. We present experimental results showing that, on a range of small benchmark programs, sparse labeling provides a substantial (30%--50%) speed-up over universal labeling.
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Citations
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Cited by
Information flow control for secure cloud computing
Bacon, J., Eyers, D., Pasquier, T. F. J.-M., Singh, J., Papagiannis, I., & Pietzuch, P. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management · doi:10.1109/tnsm.2013.122313.130423 · Cited by 105
Metadata
- Authors
- Austin, T. H., & Flanagan, C.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Fourth Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2009-06-15
- Pages
- 113-124
- OpenAlex
- W2066195326
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 7.05
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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