The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions
Abstract
In this paper we present and analyze a model in which users select among, and subsequently compete in, a collection of contests offering various rewards. The objective is to capture the essential features of a crowdsourcing system, an environment in which diverse tasks are presented to a large community. We aim to demonstrate the precise relationship between incentives and participation in such systems.
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Citations
Cites
Boyd, S., & Vandenberghe, L. (2004) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804441 · Cited by 56,601
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.3.542 · Cited by 860
The all-pay auction with complete information
Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (1996) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01211819 · Cited by 812
Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
Milgrom, P., & Weber, R. J. (1985) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.10.4.619 · Cited by 557
Crowdsourcing and knowledge sharing: strategic user behavior on taskcn
Yang, J., Adamic, L. A., & Ackerman, M. S. (2008) · Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce · doi:10.1145/1386790.1386829 · Cited by 190
Knowledge Market Design: A Field Experiment at Google Answers
CHEN, Y., Ho, T., & Kim, Y. (2010) · Journal of Public Economic Theory · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01468.x · Cited by 112
Cited by
Towards an integrated crowdsourcing definition
Estellés-Arolas, E., & González-Ladrón-de-Guevara, F. (2012) · Journal of Information Science · doi:10.1177/0165551512437638 · Cited by 1,858
The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing
Horton, J. J., & Chilton, L. B. (2010) · Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce · doi:10.1145/1807342.1807376 · Cited by 601
Evaluation on crowdsourcing research: Current status and future direction
Zhao, Y., & Zhu, Q. (2014) · Information Systems Frontiers · doi:10.1007/s10796-012-9350-4 · Cited by 566
Task Design, Motivation, and Participation in Crowdsourcing Contests
Zheng, H., Li, D., & Hou, W. (2011) · International Journal of Electronic Commerce · doi:10.2753/jec1086-4415150402 · Cited by 538
A Survey of Crowdsourcing Systems
Yuen, M.-C., King, I., & Leung, K.-S. (2011) · 2011 IEEE Third Int'l Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust and 2011 IEEE Third Int'l Conference on Social Computing · doi:10.1109/passat/socialcom.2011.203 · Cited by 392
Metadata
- Authors
- DiPalantino, D., & Vojnovic, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2009-07-06
- Pages
- 119-128
- OpenAlex
- W2124576904
- Cited by
- 292
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 12.79
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.