The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Privacy-preserving fingercode authentication
Open accessAbstract
We present a privacy preserving protocol for fingerprint-based authentication. We consider a scenario where a client equipped with a fingerprint reader is interested into learning if the acquired fingerprint belongs to the database of authorized entities managed by a server. For security, it is required that the client does not learn anything on the database and the server should not get any information about the requested biometry and the outcome of the matching process. The proposed protocol follows a multi-party computation approach and makes extensive use of homomorphic encryption as underlying cryptographic primitive. To keep the protocol complexity as low as possible, a particular representation of fingerprint images, named Fingercode, is adopted. Although the previous works on privacy-preserving biometric identification focus on selecting the best matching identity in the database, our main solution is a generic identification protocol and it allows to select and report all the enrolled identities whose distance to the user's fingercode is under a given threshold. Variants for simple authentication purposes are provided. Our protocols gain a notable bandwidth saving (about 25-39%) if compared with the best previous work (ICISC'09) and its computational complexity is still low and suitable for practical applications. Moreover, even if such protocols are presented in the context of a fingerprint-based system, they can be generalized to any biometric system that shares the same matching methodology, namely distance computation and thresholding.
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Cites
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Elgamal, T. (1985) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1985.1057074 · Cited by 8,059
Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes
Paillier, P. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48910-x_16 · Cited by 7,250
Cited by
A survey on biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics
Rathgeb, C., & Uhl, A. (2011) · EURASIP Journal on Information Security · doi:10.1186/1687-417x-2011-3 · Cited by 641
More efficient oblivious transfer and extensions for faster secure computation
Asharov, G., Lindell, Y., Schneider, T., & Zohner, M. (2013) · Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security - CCS '13 · doi:10.1145/2508859.2516738 · Cited by 358
Lagendijk, R. L., & Barni, M. (2013) · IEEE Signal Processing Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2012.2219653 · Cited by 336
Self-citationCloudID: Trustworthy cloud-based and cross-enterprise biometric identification
Haghighat, M., Zonouz, S., & Abdel-Mottaleb, M. (2015) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2015.06.025 · Cited by 296
Ferrag, M. A., Maglaras, L., Argyriou, A., Kosmanos, D., & Janicke, H. (2018) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2017.10.017 · Cited by 274
Metadata
- Authors
- Barni, M., Bianchi, T., Catalano, D., Di Raimondo, M., Donida Labati, R., Failla, P., Fiore, D., Lazzeretti, R., Piuri, V., Scotti, F., & Piva, A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Multimedia and security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2010-09-09
- Pages
- 231-240
- OpenAlex
- W2127173670
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 20.22
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Barni, M., Bianchi, T., Catalano, D., Di Raimondo, M., Donida Labati, R., Failla, P., Fiore, D., Lazzeretti, R., Piuri, V., Scotti, F., & Piva, A. (2010). Privacy-preserving fingercode authentication. Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Multimedia and security. https://doi.org/10.1145/1854229.1854270
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