Detection of anomalous insiders in collaborative environments via relational analysis of access logs
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Collaborative information systems (CIS) are deployed within a diverse array of environments, ranging from the Internet to intelligence agencies to healthcare. It is increasingly the case that such systems are applied to manage sensitive information, making them targets for malicious insiders. While sophisticated security mechanisms have been developed to detect insider threats in various file systems, they are neither designed to model nor to monitor collaborative environments in which users function in dynamic teams with complex behavior. In this paper, we introduce a community-based anomaly detection system (CADS), an unsupervised learning framework to detect insider threats based on information recorded in the access logs of collaborative environments. CADS is based on the observation that typical users tend to form community structures, such that users with low affinity to such communities are indicative of anomalous and potentially illicit behavior. The model consists of two primary components: relational pattern extraction and anomaly detection. For relational pattern extraction, CADS infers community structures from CIS access logs, and subsequently derives communities, which serve as the CADS pattern core. CADS then uses a formal statistical model to measure the deviation of users from the inferred communities to predict which users are anomalies. To empirically evaluate the threat detection model, we perform an analysis with six months of access logs from a real electronic health record system in a large medical center, as well as a publicly available dataset for replication purposes. The results illustrate that CADS can distinguish simulated anomalous users in the context of real user behavior with a high degree of certainty and with significant performance gains in comparison to several competing anomaly detection models.
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Cites
Collaborative Management of Chronic Illness
Von Korff, M., Gruman, J., Schaefer, J., Curry, S. J., & Wagner, E. H. (1997) · Annals of Internal Medicine · doi:10.7326/0003-4819-127-12-199712150-00008 · Cited by 1,269 · cited 1×
“To empirically evaluatethethreatdetection model,weperformananalysis with six months of access logs from a real electronic health recordsysteminalarge medical center,aswell asapubliclyavailable dataset for replication purposes.”
MethodSocial Network Profiles as Taste Performances
Liu, H. (2007) · Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication · doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00395.x · Cited by 414
Cited by
Pimentel, M. A. F., Clifton, D. A., Clifton, L., & Tarassenko, L. (2014) · Signal Processing · doi:10.1016/j.sigpro.2013.12.026 · Cited by 1,649
A New Take on Detecting Insider Threats: Exploring the Use of Hidden Markov Models
Rashid, T., Agrafiotis, I., & Nurse, J. R. C. (2016) · Proceedings of the 8th ACM CCS International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats · doi:10.1145/2995959.2995964 · Cited by 152
“Keywords Insider threat; Anomaly detection system; Machine learning”
BackgroundRule, A., Chiang, M. F., & Hribar, M. R. (2020) · Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association · doi:10.1093/jamia/ocz196 · Cited by 136
A Review of Insider Threat Detection Approaches With IoT Perspective
Kim, A., Oh, J., Ryu, J., & Lee, K. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2990195 · Cited by 93
Smart Insiders: Exploring the Threat from Insiders Using the Internet-of-Things
Nurse, J. R. C., Erola, A., Agrafiotis, I., Goldsmith, M., & Creese, S. (2015) · 2015 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIoT) · doi:10.1109/siot.2015.10 · Cited by 47
Metadata
- Authors
- Chen, Y., & Malin, B.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2011-02-21
- Volume
- 2011
- Pages
- 63-74
- OpenAlex
- W2106353924
- Cited by
- 78
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 8.57
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Chen, Y., & Malin, B. (2011). Detection of anomalous insiders in collaborative environments via relational analysis of access logs. Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy. https://doi.org/10.1145/1943513.1943524
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