On the (im)possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A message recognition protocol (MRP) aims to exchange authenticated information in an insecure channel. During the initialization session of the protocol, the parties exchange some authenticated information which the adversary can passively observe. Then, one party wants to send authenticated messages to the other party over an insecure channel. Such security requirements are often found in wireless sensor networks.
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“Moreover, the authors also presented a very strong evidence that Message Recognition Protocols (MRPs) cannot be built from “cheap” primitives using only hash functions and XORing.”
From Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations (2022) · cites this paper as [284]
In the citing paper
“However, González Muñiz and Laud stated that symmetric-key techniques were not enough to construct message recognition protocols in [284].”
From Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations (2022) · cites this paper as [284]
Citations
Cites
On the security of public key protocols
Dolev, D., & Yao, A. (1983) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1983.1056650 · Cited by 5,833
Goldreich, O. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511546891 · Cited by 2,181
A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption Function
Merkle, R. C. (1988) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48184-2_32 · Cited by 1,998 · cited 1×
“Interestingly, it does not hold in the computational setting where signature schemes can be constructed from symmetric encryption [22] and one-way hash functions.”
BackgroundIEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(2023) · IT Professional · doi:10.1109/mitp.2023.3246667 · Cited by 1,167
The Resurrecting Duckling: Security Issues for Ad-hoc Wireless Networks
Stajano, F., & Anderson, R. (2000) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/10720107_24 · Cited by 1,160
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Goldreich, O. (2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · Cited by 1,019
TinyECC: A Configurable Library for Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Wireless Sensor Networks
Liu, A., & Ning, P. (2008) · 2008 International Conference on Information Processing in Sensor Networks (ipsn 2008) · doi:10.1109/ipsn.2008.47 · Cited by 924
Limits on the provable consequences of one-way permutations
Impagliazzo, R., & Rudich, S. (1989) · Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '89 · doi:10.1145/73007.73012 · Cited by 575
A Fair Non-repudiation Protocol
Zhou, J., & Gollmann, D. (2007) · Cited by 371
Finding collisions on a one-way street: Can secure hash functions be based on general assumptions?
Simon, D. R. (1998) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/bfb0054137 · Cited by 280
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- 10.5555/794201.795170 · doi:10.5555/794201.795170
- 10.5555/1150577.1150581 · doi:10.5555/1150577.1150581
Cited by
Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations
Yaacoub, J.-P. A., Noura, H. N., Salman, O., & Chehab, A. (2022) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-021-00545-8 · Cited by 320
“This helps by reducing and preventing further exploitation and future cyber-attack(s).”
Wang, D., & Wang, P. (2014) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2014.07.010 · Cited by 205
Secure Association for the Internet of Things
Benin, A., Toledo, S., & Tromer, E. (2015) · International Workshop Secure Internet Things · doi:10.1109/siot.2015.14 · Cited by 8
Implementing Cryptographic Primitives in the Symbolic Model
Laud, P. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-20398-5_20 · Cited by 1
Self-citationSecure Association for the Internet of Things.Preprint
Benin, A., Toledo, S., & Tromer, E. (2015) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Metadata
- Authors
- González Muñiz, M., & Laud, P.
- Affiliations
- Cybernetica AS, Tallinn, Estonia
- Cybernetica (Estonia) (EE)
- ORCID
- Laud, Peeter
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2011-03-21
- Pages
- 1510-1515
- OpenAlex
- W2091060878
- Cited by
- 5
- References
- 33
- Citations by year
- 2021: 1 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 0.57
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Estonian Science Foundation (8124)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
- Keywords
- public-key cryptography, authentication, passive eavesdropping, wireless sensor networks, impossibility results
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On the (im)possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/1982185.1982508
- The paper
- González Muñiz, M., & Laud, P. (2011). On the (im)possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography. Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing. https://doi.org/10.1145/1982185.1982508
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.