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A cross-protocol attack on the TLS protocol

Mavrogiannopoulos, Nikos, Vercauteren, Frederik, Velichkov, Vesselin, Preneel, Bart · 2012 · Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cited by 66

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Abstract

This paper describes a cross-protocol attack on all versions of TLS; it can be seen as an extension of the Wagner and Schneier attack on SSL 3.0. The attack presents valid explicit elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman parameters signed by a server to a client that incorrectly interprets these parameters as valid plain Diffie-Hellman parameters. Our attack enables an adversary to successfully impersonate a server to a random client after obtaining 240 signed elliptic curve keys from the original server. While attacking a specific client is improbable due to the high number of signed keys required during the lifetime of one TLS handshake, it is not completely unrealistic for a setting where the server has high computational power and the attacker contents itself with recovering one out of many session keys. We remark that popular open-source server implementations are not susceptible to this attack, since they typically do not support the explicit curve option. Finally we propose a fix that renders the protocol immune to this family of cross-protocol attacks.

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Metadata

Authors
Mavrogiannopoulos, N., Vercauteren, F., Velichkov, V., & Preneel, B.
Venue
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2012-10-16
Pages
62-72
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2094250919
Cited by
66
References
0
FWCI
4.68
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A cross-protocol attack on the TLS protocol. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/2382196.2382206
The paper
Mavrogiannopoulos, N., Vercauteren, F., Velichkov, V., & Preneel, B. (2012). A cross-protocol attack on the TLS protocol. Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2382196.2382206

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