The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CS-BuFLO: A Congestion Sensitive Website Fingerprinting Defense
Abstract
Website fingerprinting attacks enable an adversary to infer which website a victim is visiting, even if the victim uses an encrypting proxy, such as Tor. Previous work has shown that all proposed defenses against website fingerprinting attacks are ineffective. This paper advances the study of website fingerprinting defenses by first laying out the complete specifications of the CS-BuFlo scheme outlined by Cai, et al. CS-BuFlo, which is based on the BuFlo defense proposed by Dyer, et al., was not fully-specified by Cai, et al, but has nonetheless attracted the attention of the Tor developers. Next, a full working implementation of CS-BuFlo is provided. Finally, a thorough evaluation of CS-BuFlo is performed using empirical data (rather than data from simulations). Our experiments find that CS-BuFlo has high overhead (around 2.3-2.8x) but can get 6times closer to the bandwidth/security trade-off lower bound than Tor or SSH.
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Cites
Statistical identification of encrypted Web browsing traffic
Sun, Q., Simon, D. R., Wang, Y.-M., Russell, W., Padmanabhan, V. N., & Qiu, L. (2005) · Proceedings 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/secpri.2002.1004359 · Cited by 377
Cited by
Deep Fingerprinting: Undermining Website Fingerprinting Defenses with Deep Learning
Sirinam, P., Imani, M., Juarez, M., & Wright, M. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3243734.3243768 · Cited by 592
A Survey on Encrypted Network Traffic Analysis Applications, Techniques, and Countermeasures
Papadogiannaki, E., & Ioannidis, S. (2022) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3457904 · Cited by 281
Toward an Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense
Juarez, M., Imani, M., Perry, M., Diaz, C., & Wright, M. (2016) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-45744-4_2 · Cited by 273
Metadata
- Authors
- Cai, X., Nithyanand, R., & Johnson, R.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2014-11-03
- Pages
- 121-130
- OpenAlex
- W2027177092
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 3.76
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Cai, X., Nithyanand, R., & Johnson, R. (2014). CS-BuFLO: A Congestion Sensitive Website Fingerprinting Defense. Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. https://doi.org/10.1145/2665943.2665949
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