Cited by 592Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-votingPrivacy, Security, and Data ProtectionPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data

Deep Fingerprinting: Undermining Website Fingerprinting Defenses with Deep Learning

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Sirinam, Payap, Imani, Mohsen, Juarez, Marc, Wright, Matthew·2018·Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Abstract

Website fingerprinting enables a local eavesdropper to determine which websites a user is visiting over an encrypted connection. State-of-the-art website fingerprinting attacks have been shown to be effective even against Tor. Recently, lightweight website fingerprinting defenses for Tor have been proposed that substantially degrade existing attacks: WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie. In this work, we present Deep Fingerprinting (DF), a new website fingerprinting attack against Tor that leverages a type of deep learning called Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) with a sophisticated architecture design, and we evaluate this attack against WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie. The DF attack attains over 98% accuracy on Tor traffic without defenses, better than all prior attacks, and it is also the only attack that is effective against WTF-PAD with over 90% accuracy. Walkie-Talkie remains effective, holding the attack to just 49.7% accuracy. In the more realistic open-world setting, our attack remains effective, with 0.99 precision and 0.94 recall on undefended traffic. Against traffic defended with WTF-PAD in this setting, the attack still can get 0.96 precision and 0.68 recall. These findings highlight the need for effective defenses that protect against this new attack and that could be deployed in Tor.

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Authors
Sirinam, P., Imani, M., Juarez, M., & Wright, M.
Affiliations
  • Rochester Institute of Technology (US)
  • The University of Texas at Arlington (US)
  • IMEC (BE)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2018-10-15
Pages
1928-1943
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2963704216
Cited by
592
References
30
Citations by year
2026: 99 · 2025: 129 · 2024: 105 · 2023: 83 · 2022: 64 · 2021: 58 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 5
FWCI
11.43
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (CNS-1423163 and CNS-1722743)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
Keywords
website fingerprinting, Tor, encrypted traffic analysis, convolutional neural networks, deep learning attacks, walkie-talkie

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