The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pay as How Well You Do: A Quality Based Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsensing
Abstract
In crowdsensing, appropriate rewards are always expected to compensate the participants for their consumptions of physical resources and involvements of manual efforts. While continuous low quality sensing data could do harm to the availability and preciseness of crowdsensing based services, few existing incentive mechanisms have ever addressed the issue of sensing data's quality. The design of quality based incentive mechanism is motivated by its potential to avoid inefficient sensing and unnecessary rewards. In this paper, we incorporate the consideration of data quality into the design of incentive mechanism for crowdsensing, and propose to pay the participants as how well they do, to motivate the rational participants to perform data sensing efficiently. This mechanism estimates the quality of sensing data, and offers each participant a reward based on her effective contribution. We also implement the mechanism and evaluate the improvements in terms of quality of service and profit of service provider. The evaluation results show that our mechanism achieves superior performance when compared to the uniform pricing scheme.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Observer Error-Rates Using the EM Algorithm
Dawid, A. P., & Skene, A. M. (1979) · Applied Statistics · doi:10.2307/2346806 · Cited by 1,692
Strong, D. M., Lee, Y. W., & Wang, R. Y. (1997) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/253769.253804 · Cited by 1,298
Reputation-based incentive protocols in crowdsourcing applications
Zhang, Y., & van der Schaar, M. (2012) · 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM · doi:10.1109/infcom.2012.6195597 · Cited by 315
Cited by
Crowdbc: a blockchain-based decentralized framework for crowdsourcing
Li, M., Weng, J., Yang, A., Lu, W., Zhang, Y., Hou, L., Liu, J.-N., Xiang, Y., & Deng, R. H. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems · doi:10.1109/tpds.2018.2881735 · Cited by 522
The Sensable City: A Survey on the Deployment and Management for Smart City Monitoring
Du, R., Santi, P., Xiao, M., Vasilakos, A. V., & Fischione, C. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2881008 · Cited by 289
A Blockchain Based Privacy-Preserving Incentive Mechanism in Crowdsensing Applications
Wang, J., Li, M., He, Y., Li, H., Xiao, K., & Wang, C. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2805837 · Cited by 283
ZebraLancer: Private and Anonymous Crowdsourcing System atop Open Blockchain
Lu, Y., Tang, Q., & Wang, G. (2018) · 2018 IEEE 38th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS) · doi:10.1109/icdcs.2018.00087 · Cited by 224
Metadata
- Authors
- Peng, D., Wu, F., & Chen, G.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 16th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2015-06-22
- Pages
- 177-186
- OpenAlex
- W2039922069
- Cited by
- 209
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 24.89
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Pay as How Well You Do: A Quality Based Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsensing. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/2746285.2746306
- The paper
- Peng, D., Wu, F., & Chen, G. (2015). Pay as How Well You Do: A Quality Based Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsensing. Proceedings of the 16th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing. https://doi.org/10.1145/2746285.2746306
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.