The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Spy in the Sandbox: Practical Cache Attacks in JavaScript and their Implications
Abstract
We present a micro-architectural side-channel attack that runs entirely in the browser. In contrast to previous work in this genre, our attack does not require the attacker to install software on the victim's machine; to facilitate the attack, the victim needs only to browse to an untrusted webpage that contains attacker-controlled content. This makes our attack model highly scalable, and extremely relevant and practical to today's Web, as most desktop browsers currently used to access the Internet are affected by such side channel threats. Our attack, which is an extension to the last-level cache attacks of Liu et al., allows a remote adversary to recover information belonging to other processes, users, and even virtual machines running on the same physical host with the victim web browser. We describe the fundamentals behind our attack, and evaluate its performance characteristics. In addition, we show how it can be used to compromise user privacy in a common setting, letting an attacker spy after a victim that uses private browsing. Defending against this side channel is possible, but the required countermeasures can exact an impractical cost on benign uses of the browser.
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Citations
Cites
Yet another MicroArchitectural Attack: exploiting I-Cache
Aciiçmez, O. (2007) · Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Computer security architecture · doi:10.1145/1314466.1314469 · Cited by 232
Cited by
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Kocher, P., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., Schwarz, M., & Yarom, Y. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.01203 · Cited by 1,850
Rowhammer.js: A Remote Software-Induced Fault Attack in JavaScript
Gruss, D., Maurice, C., & Mangard, S. (2016) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-40667-1_15 · Cited by 373
Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks
Schwarz, M., Weiser, S., Gruss, D., Maurice, C., & Mangard, S. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-60876-1_1 · Cited by 339
Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX
Wang, W., Chen, G., Pan, X., Zhang, Y., Wang, X., Bindschaedler, V., Tang, H., & Gunter, C. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134038 · Cited by 320
Spectre attacks: exploiting speculative execution
Kocher, P., Horn, J., Fogh, A., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., et al. (2020) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3399742 · Cited by 281
Metadata
- Authors
- Oren, Y., Kemerlis, V. P., Sethumadhavan, S., & Keromytis, A. D.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2015-10-12
- Pages
- 1406-1418
- OpenAlex
- W2061354941
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 15.15
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Oren, Y., Kemerlis, V. P., Sethumadhavan, S., & Keromytis, A. D. (2015). The Spy in the Sandbox: Practical Cache Attacks in JavaScript and their Implications. Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813708
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