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Cited by 64Advanced Malware Detection TechniquesSecurity and Verification in ComputingDigital and Cyber Forensics

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Android Root and its Providers: A Double-Edged Sword

Zhang, Hang, She, Dongdong, Qian, Zhiyun·2015·Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813714
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Abstract

Android root is the voluntary and legitimate process of gaining the highest privilege and full control over a user's Android device. To facilitate the popular demand, a unique Android root ecosystem has formed where a variety of root providers begin to offer root as a service. Even though legitimate, many convenient one-click root methods operate by exploiting vulnerabilities in the Android system. If not carefully controlled, such exploits can be abused by malware author to gain unauthorized root privilege. To understand such risks, we undertake a study on a number of popular yet mysterious Android root providers focusing on 1) if their exploits are adequately protected. 2) the relationship between their proprietary exploits and publicly available ones. We find that even though protections are usually employed, the effort is substantially undermined by a few systematic and sometimes obvious weaknesses we discover. From one large provider, we are able to extract more than 160 exploit binaries that are well-engineered and up-to date, corresponding to more than 50 families, exceeding the number of exploits we can find publicly. We are able to identify at least 10 device driver exploits that are never reported in the public. Besides, for a popular kernel vulnerability (futex bug), the provider has engineered 89 variants to cover devices with different Android versions and configurations. Even worse, we find few of the exploit binaries can be detected by mobile antivirus software.

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References 18 · Cited by 64

Research works printed but not linked: 24

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Metadata

Authors
Zhang, H., She, D., & Qian, Z.
Affiliations
University of California, Riverside (US)
ORCID
Venue
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2015-10-12
Pages
1093-1104
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1145/2810103.2813714
OpenAlex
W2114381667
Cited by
64
References
18
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 8
FWCI
7.80
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.acm.org/publications/policies/copyright_policy#Background (vor)
Locations
  • ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
  • Rare & Special e-Zone (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Army Research Lab (4939-UCR-ARMY-0045)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital and Cyber Forensics
Keywords
Android security

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Android Root and its Providers: A Double-Edged Sword. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/2810103.2813714
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Zhang, H., She, D., & Qian, Z. (2015). Android Root and its Providers: A Double-Edged Sword. Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813714

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