Uncovering Privacy Leakage in BLE Network Traffic of Wearable Fitness Trackers
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
There has been a tremendous increase in popularity and adoption of wearable fitness trackers. These fitness trackers predominantly use Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) for communicating and syncing the data with user's smartphone. This paper presents a measurement-driven study of possible privacy leakage from BLE communication between the fitness tracker and the smartphone. Using real BLE traffic traces collected in the wild and in controlled experiments, we show that majority of the fitness trackers use unchanged BLE address while advertising, making it feasible to track them. The BLE traffic of the fitness trackers is found to be correlated with the intensity of user's activity, making it possible for an eavesdropper to determine user's current activity (walking, sitting, idle or running) through BLE traffic analysis. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that the BLE traffic can represent user's gait which is known to be distinct from user to user. This makes it possible to identify a person (from a small group of users) based on the BLE traffic of her fitness tracker. As BLE-based wearable fitness trackers become widely adopted, our aim is to identify important privacy implications of their usage and discuss prevention strategies.
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Cites
Understanding and Modeling of WiFi Signal Based Human Activity Recognition
Wang, W., Liu, A. X., Shahzad, M., Ling, K., & Lu, S. (2015) · Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking · doi:10.1145/2789168.2790093 · Cited by 1,110
Cited by
A Survey of Wearable Devices and Challenges
Seneviratne, S., Hu, Y., Nguyen, T., Lan, G., Khalifa, S., Thilakarathna, K., Hassan, M., & Seneviratne, A. (2017) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2017.2731979 · Cited by 821
IoT: Internet of Threats? A Survey of Practical Security Vulnerabilities in Real IoT Devices
Meneghello, F., Calore, M., Zucchetto, D., Polese, M., & Zanella, A. (2019) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2019.2935189 · Cited by 799
Habibzadeh, H., Nussbaum, B. H., Anjomshoa, F., Kantarci, B., & Soyata, T. (2019) · Sustainable Cities and Society · doi:10.1016/j.scs.2019.101660 · Cited by 303
Peek-a-boo: i see your smart home activities, even encrypted!
Acar, A., Fereidooni, H., Abera, T., Sikder, A. K., Miettinen, M., Aksu, H., Conti, M., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Uluagac, S. (2020) · Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks · doi:10.1145/3395351.3399421 · Cited by 264
Yaqoob, T., Abbas, H., & Atiquzzaman, M. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2914094 · Cited by 236
“features [199].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Das, A. K., Pathak, P. H., Chuah, C.-N., & Mohapatra, P.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 17th International Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2016-02-23
- Pages
- 99-104
- ISSN
- 1550-6193 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2274307588
- Cited by
- 126
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 14.90
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Das, A. K., Pathak, P. H., Chuah, C.-N., & Mohapatra, P. (2016). Uncovering Privacy Leakage in BLE Network Traffic of Wearable Fitness Trackers. Proceedings of the 17th International Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications. https://doi.org/10.1145/2873587.2873594
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