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Cited by 191

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Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets

Shinde, Shweta, Chua, Zheng Leong, Narayanan, Viswesh, Saxena, Prateek·2016·Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Abstract

New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this paper, we show that the page fault side-channel has sufficient channel capacity to extract bits of encryption keys from commodity implementations of cryptographic routines in OpenSSL and Libgcrypt -- leaking 27% on average and up to 100% of the secret bits in many case-studies. To mitigate this, we propose a software-only defense that masks page fault patterns by determinising the program's memory access behavior. We show that such a technique can be built into a compiler, and implement it for a subset of C which is sufficient to handle the cryptographic routines we study. This defense when implemented generically can have significant overhead of up to 4000X, but with help of developer-assisted compiler optimizations, the overhead reduces to at most 29.22% in our case studies. Finally, we discuss scope for hardware-assisted defenses, and show one solution that can reduce overheads to 6.77% with support from hardware changes.

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Metadata

Authors
Shinde, S., Chua, Z. L., Narayanan, V., & Saxena, P.
Venue
Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2016-05-30
Pages
317-328
OpenAlex
W2402811135
Cited by
191
References
1
FWCI
16.88
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/2897845.2897885
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Shinde, S., Chua, Z. L., Narayanan, V., & Saxena, P. (2016). Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets. Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897885

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