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Blockchain Mining Games
Open accessAbstract
We study the strategic considerations of miners participating in the bitcoin's protocol. We formulate and study the stochastic game that underlies these strategic considerations. The miners collectively build a tree of blocks, and they are paid when they create a node (mine a block) which will end up in the path of the tree that is adopted by all. Since the miners can hide newly mined nodes, they play a game with incomplete information. Here we consider two simplified forms of this game in which the miners have complete information. In the simplest game the miners release every mined block immediately, but are strategic on which blocks to mine. In the second more complicated game, when a block is mined it is announced immediately, but it may not be released so that other miners cannot continue mining from it. A miner not only decides which blocks to mine, but also when to release blocks to other miners. In both games, we show that when the computational power of each miner is relatively small, their best response matches the expected behavior of the bitcoin designer. However, when the computational power of a miner is large, he deviates from the expected behavior, and other Nash equilibria arise.
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Cited by
A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues of Bitcoin
Conti, M., Sandeep Kumar, E., Lal, C., & Ruj, S. (2018) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2842460 · Cited by 1,116
“There are numerous proposals [177]–[179] which shows that the use of the game-theoretic approaches provides useful information about the effects of selfish mining, block withholding, discarding attacks, and the incentive distribution problem in the mining pools.”
BackgroundOn Security Analysis of Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET)
Chen, L., Xu, L., Shah, N., Gao, Z., Lu, Y., & Shi, W. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-69084-1_19 · Cited by 351
“[20] studies mining as a game in Bitcoin and analyzes the best strategy of users.”
BackgroundOn the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward
Carlsten, M., Kalodner, H., Weinberg, S. M., & Narayanan, A. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978408 · Cited by 328
FruitChains: A Fair Blockchain
Pass, R., & Shi, E. (2017) · Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing · doi:10.1145/3087801.3087809 · Cited by 307
Cloud/Fog Computing Resource Management and Pricing for Blockchain Networks
Xiong, Z., Feng, S., Wang, W., Niyato, D., Wang, P., & Han, Z. (2019) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2871706 · Cited by 303
Metadata
- Authors
- Kiayias, A., Koutsoupias, E., Kyropoulou, M., & Tselekounis, Y.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2016-07-21
- Pages
- 365-382
- OpenAlex
- W2465219533
- Cited by
- 234
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 21.37
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Kiayias, A., Koutsoupias, E., Kyropoulou, M., & Tselekounis, Y. (2016). Blockchain Mining Games. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940773
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