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Cited by 405

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

High-Throughput Semi-Honest Secure Three-Party Computation with an Honest Majority

Araki, Toshinori, Furukawa, Jun, Lindell, Yehuda, Nof, Ariel, Ohara, Kazuma·2016·Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Abstract

In this paper, we describe a new information-theoretic protocol (and a computationally-secure variant) for secure three-party computation with an honest majority. The protocol has very minimal computation and communication; for Boolean circuits, each party sends only a single bit for every AND gate (and nothing is sent for XOR gates). Our protocol is (simulation-based) secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, and achieves privacy in the client/server model in the presence of malicious adversaries. On a cluster of three 20-core servers with a 10Gbps connection, the implementation of our protocol carries out over 1.3 million AES computations per second, which involves processing over 7 billion gates per second. In addition, we developed a Kerberos extension that replaces the ticket-granting-ticket encryption on the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT-Kerberos with our protocol, using keys/ passwords that are shared between the servers. This enables the use of Kerberos while protecting passwords. Our implementation is able to support a login storm of over 35,000 logins per second, which suffices even for very large organizations. Our work demonstrates that high-throughput secure computation is possible on standard hardware.

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Show all 18 references

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. 10.5555/874063.875553 · doi:10.5555/874063.875553
  2. 10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_31 · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_31
  3. 10.1145/2810103.2813619 · doi:10.1145/2810103.2813619
  4. 10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3_26 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3_26
  5. M. Keller , E. Orsini and P. Scholl . Actively Secure OT Extension with Optimal Overhead. In CRYPTO 2015 , Springer (LNCS 9215), pages 724--741 , 2015 . M. Keller, E. Orsini and P. Scholl. Actively Secure OT Extension with Optimal Overhead. In CRYPTO 2015, Springer (LNCS 9215), pages 724--741, 2015.
  6. 10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_18 · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_18
  7. E. Kushilevitz , Y. Lindell and T. Rabin . Information-Theoretically Secure Protocols and Security Under Composition. In the SIAM Journal on Computing , 39 ( 5 ): 2090 -- 2112 , 2010 . E. Kushilevitz, Y. Lindell and T. Rabin. Information-Theoretically Secure Protocols and Security Under Composition. In the SIAM Journal on Computing, 39(5): 2090--2112, 2010.
  8. 10.1145/2364527.2364556 · doi:10.1145/2364527.2364556
  9. 10.1145/2619239.2626309 · doi:10.1145/2619239.2626309
  10. . Randmets. Personal comm. -- AES performance on the new Sharemind cluster . May , 2016 . . Randmets. Personal comm. -- AES performance on the new Sharemind cluster. May, 2016.

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Metadata

Authors
Araki, T., Furukawa, J., Lindell, Y., Nof, A., & Ohara, K.
Venue
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2016-10-24
Volume
2016
Pages
805-817
OpenAlex
W2536058570
Cited by
405
References
18
FWCI
15.43
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Funders
European Research Council (615172)

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Araki, T., Furukawa, J., Lindell, Y., Nof, A., & Ohara, K. (2016). High-Throughput Semi-Honest Secure Three-Party Computation with an Honest Majority. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978331

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