Cited by 228Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in DataSecurity and Verification in Computing

A uror: defending against poisoning attacks in collaborative deep learning systems

Shen, Shiqi, Tople, Shruti, Saxena, Prateek·2016·Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference on Computer Security Applications

Abstract

Deep learning in a collaborative setting is emerging as a corner-stone of many upcoming applications, wherein untrusted users collaborate to generate more accurate models. From the security perspective, this opens collaborative deep learning to poisoning attacks, wherein adversarial users deliberately alter their inputs to mis-train the model. These attacks are known for machine learning systems in general, but their impact on new deep learning systems is not well-established.

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Crossref · 10.1145/2991079.2991125

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  • Mirai is a highly relevant baseline for IoT malware behavior because its source code is publicly available, variants use the same code base, and it realizes similar attack stages as state-of-the-art IoT malware.

    “We selected Mirai for this purpose, since its source code is publicly available and several infamous malware variants like Hajime [2] or Persirai [27] have been implemented using the same code base.Mirai also realizes similar attack stages (detailed in Sect.V-A3 below) as stateof-the-art IoT malware [3], [28].This makes Mirai a highly relevant baseline for IoT malware behavior.”
  • DÏOT is likely effective also in detecting other botnet malware like Persirai and Hajime.

    “D ÏOT is likely effective also in detecting other botnet malware like Persirai [27], Hajime [2], etc.”
  • FL workflow can be realized with diverse topologies; the two most common are the centralized approach via an aggregation server or peer-to-peer decentralized approaches.

    “FL workflow can be realized with diverse topologies.The two most common ones are either the centralized approach via an aggregation server or peer-to-peer decentralized approaches [126]- [130].”

    From Vulnerabilities in federated learning (2021) · cites this paper as [127]

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References 41 · Cited by 228

Authors
Shen, S., Tople, S., & Saxena, P.
Affiliations
National University of Singapore (SG)
Venue
Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference on Computer Security Applications
Publisher
ACM
Published
2016-12-05
Pages
508-519
ISSN
1063-9527 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2559840118
Cited by
228
References
41
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 39 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 24 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 6
FWCI
6.11
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
collaborative deep learning, poisoning attacks, adversarial examples, untrusted users, data poisoning

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