Cited by 663Network Security and Intrusion DetectionInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-votingIoT and Edge/Fog Computing

DÏoT: A Federated Self-learning Anomaly Detection System for IoT

Open access
Nguyen, Thien Duc, Marchal, Samuel, Miettinen, Markus, Fereidooni, Hossein, Asokan, N., Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza·2019·2019 IEEE 39th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)

Abstract

IoT devices are increasingly deployed in daily life. Many of these devices are, however, vulnerable due to insecure design, implementation, and configuration. As a result, many networks already have vulnerable IoT devices that are easy to compromise. This has led to a new category of malware specifically targeting IoT devices. However, existing intrusion detection techniques are not effective in detecting compromised IoT devices given the massive scale of the problem in terms of the number of different types of devices and manufacturers involved. In this paper, we present DÏoT, an autonomous self-learning distributed system for detecting compromised IoT devices. DÏoT builds effectively on device-type-specific communication profiles without human intervention nor labeled data that are subsequently used to detect anomalous deviations in devices' communication behavior, potentially caused by malicious adversaries. DÏoT utilizes a federated learning approach for aggregating behavior profiles efficiently. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first system to employ a federated learning approach to anomaly-detection-based intrusion detection. Consequently, DÏoT can cope with emerging new and unknown attacks. We systematically and extensively evaluated more than 30 off-the-shelf IoT devices over a long term and show that DÏoT is highly effective (95.6% detection rate) and fast (257 ms) at detecting devices compromised by, for instance, the infamous Mirai malware. DÏoT reported no false alarms when evaluated in a real-world smart home deployment setting.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

DÏoT is a self-learning, federated anomaly-detection system for IoT that builds device-type-specific communication profiles from unlabeled traffic and detects deviations using GRU-based packet-sequence modeling. It detected 95.6% of Mirai attacks with 0% false positives in a one-week real-world deployment, with average detection delay 257 ± 194 ms.

Key findings

  • Across 33 off-the-shelf devices mapped to 23 device types, DÏoT achieved 95.60% TPR and 0% FPR in the Deployment (14 devices, 10 types) and Attack (5 devices) datasets; average detection delay was 257 ± 194 ms.
  • Attack-stage TPRs were: pre-infection 100%, infection 93.45%, scanning 100%, DoS 88.96%, and standby 33.33%; pre-infection was detected after 223 packets while Mirai generates more than 900 packets during pre-infection.
  • Federated learning with 15 clients reduced TPR from 95.60% centralized to 94.07% while FPR remained 0.00%; more participating clients improved FPR.
  • Device-type-specific models outperformed a single model for all devices: the single model increased FPR from 0% to 0.67% and TPR from 95.6% to 97.21%; less than 25 hours of data achieved FPR = 0, or 2.5 hours per client with ten clients.

Methods

  • Design: Security Gateway monitors IoT traffic; packets are mapped to symbols using 7-tuple packet characteristics; a GRU estimates symbol occurrence probabilities; packets with probability below δ are anomalous, and an alarm triggers when the fraction of anomalous packets in a window exceeds γ; federated learning aggregates local GRU models at the IoT Security Service.
  • Data: Activity dataset (33 devices, 165 h, 2,087,280 packets), Deployment dataset (14 devices, 2,352 h / one week, 2,286,697 packets), and Attack dataset (5 Mirai-vulnerable devices, 84 h, 21,919,273 packets); 33 devices were mapped to 23 device types.
  • Analysis: FPR/TPR with four-fold cross-validation, window w = 250, selected δ = 0.01 and γ = 0.5; federated experiments used 2–15 clients, 17 local epochs, and 3 communication rounds (51 total epochs); processing performance was measured on laptop and desktop hardware.

Limitations

  • Stated: the number of devices was limited because the WiFi interface allowed at most 16 devices to connect simultaneously; assumptions include no malicious manufacturers (A1), an uncompromised Security Gateway (A2), and available automated device-type identification (A3); poisoning defenses for federated learning are left to ongoing research.
  • Stated: attack evaluation focuses on Mirai; the authors argue DÏoT is likely effective for other botnets such as Persirai and Hajime but do not evaluate them.
  • Evident from the text: the attack dataset was collected from only 5 vulnerable devices and the deployment dataset from 14 devices, so results may not cover all 33 devices or 23 device types; federated learning showed a small TPR loss versus centralized training (95.60% to 94.07% with 15 clients).

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/icdcs.2019.00080

Cites

52 of 52 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Claims the paper makes

0 of 16 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingnone given

    DÏoT reported no false alarms when evaluated in a real-world smart home deployment setting.

    “D ÏOT reported no false alarms when evaluated in a real-world smart home deployment setting.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data

    DÏoT is highly effective (95.6% detection rate) at detecting devices compromised by Mirai.

    “We systematically and extensively evaluated more than 30 off-theshelf IoT devices over a long term and show that D ÏOT is highly effective (95.6 % detection rate) and fast (≈ 257 ms) at detecting devices compromised by, for instance, the infamous Mirai malware.”
    • Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · boosted
      “Systematic and extensive experimental analysis using more than 30 off-the-shelf IoT devices, showing that D ÏOT is fast (detection in ≈257 ms) and effective (95.6 % true positive rate, zero false alarms, i.e., 0 % false positive rate) (Sect.VI).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [1]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Findingown data

    DÏoT is fast (≈257 ms) at detecting devices compromised by Mirai.

    “We systematically and extensively evaluated more than 30 off-theshelf IoT devices over a long term and show that D ÏOT is highly effective (95.6 % detection rate) and fast (≈ 257 ms) at detecting devices compromised by, for instance, the infamous Mirai malware.”
    • Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · boosted
      “Systematic and extensive experimental analysis using more than 30 off-the-shelf IoT devices, showing that D ÏOT is fast (detection in ≈257 ms) and effective (95.6 % true positive rate, zero false alarms, i.e., 0 % false positive rate) (Sect.VI).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [1]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Findingown data

    An Attack dataset of network traffic generated by real off-the-shelf consumer IoT devices infected with real IoT malware (Mirai) was collected and used to evaluate DÏoT.

    “An Attack dataset of network traffic generated by real off-the-shelf consumer IoT devices infected with real IoT malware (Mirai [1]) using which we evaluate the effectiveness of D ÏOT (Sect.V-A).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [1]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Findingown data

    Average detection delay over all tested attacks is 257 ± 194 ms.

    “The average detection delay over all tested attacks is 257 ± 194 ms.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 24
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 5
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 7
  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data

    Federated learning with 5, 9, or 15 clients causes small TPR decrease, FPR constant at 0.00%.

    “Tab.VI shows a small decrease in TPR as we increase the number of clients”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Average processing time per packet was 0.081 ms on desktop GPU and 0.592 ms on laptop CPU.

    “Average processing time per symbol (packet) for prediction was 0.081(±0.001)ms for the desktop utilizing its GPU and 0.592(±0.001)ms when executed on the laptop with CPU.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data

    Single model yields FPR 0.67% and TPR 97.21%, worse FPR than device-type-specific.

    “FPR increases from 0% to 0.67% while TPR increases from 95.6% to 97.21%.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Malicious packets get very low probability estimates (<10^-4), distinguishing them clearly from benign packets.

    “Malicious packets (represented by symbol '#0') get very low probability estimates (<10 -4 ), distinguishing them clearly from benign packets.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The monitored devices included 33 typical consumer IoT devices mapped to 23 unique device types.

    “The monitored devices included 33 typical consumer IoT devices like IP cameras, smart power plugs and light bulbs, sensors, etc.The devices were mapped by our device-type-identification method to 23 unique device types.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Probability estimates are on average higher for packets belonging to benign traffic patterns and lower for packets generated by malware on an infected device.

    “From Fig. 3b we can see that these probability estimates are on average higher for packets belonging to benign traffic patterns, and lower for packets generated by malware on an infected device and can therefore be flagged as anomalous.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Federated models with more clients achieve better FPR, while TPR deteriorates only slightly.

    “the federated models with more participating clients achieve better FPR, while TPR deteriorates only slightly.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingreasoning

    DoS attacks have lower detection rate but all are eventually detected; 88.96% TPR.

    “Considering the 88.96% TPR we achieve on DoS attacks, four windows out of five are detected as anomalous and trigger an alarm.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    DÏoT builds on device-type-specific communication profiles without human intervention nor labeled data to detect anomalous deviations in devices' communication behavior potentially caused by malicious adversaries.

    “D ÏOT builds effectively on device-type-specific communication profiles without human intervention nor labeled data that are subsequently used to detect anomalous deviations in devices' communication behavior, potentially caused by malicious adversaries.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Anomaly detection works by profiling the normal behavior of devices and detecting attacks as deviations from this normal behavior profile.

    “To detect previously unknown attacks anomaly detection needs to be used which works by profiling the normal behavior of devices and detecting attacks as deviations from this normal behavior profile [7]- [9].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [7]- [9]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    DÏoT uses a novel device-type-specific anomaly detection approach to achieve accurate detection of attacks while generating almost no false alarms.

    “It uses a novel device-type-specific anomaly detection approach to achieve accurate detection of attacks while generating almost no false alarms.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    IoT devices typically do not generate a lot of network traffic, making it challenging to train comprehensive models that accurately cover the full behavior of IoT devices.

    “Second, IoT devices do typically not (notwithstanding a few exceptions) generate a lot of network traffic, as their communications are limited to, e.g., status updates about sensor readings or (relatively) infrequent interactions related to user commands.This scarcity of communications makes it challenging to train comprehensive models that can accurately cover the full behavior of IoT devices.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Device-type-specific models are less prone to trigger false alarms because each model covers only behavior of a specific device type, and IoT devices are single-use appliances with relatively static and limited behavior patterns.

    “Consequently, each model needs to cover only the behavior of a specific device type.As IoT devices are typically single-use appliances with only a few different functions, their behavior patterns are relatively static and limited, allowing the model to accurately capture all possible legitimate behaviors of a device type.Thus, the model is less prone to trigger false alarms (details in Sect.VI-D),”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    An all-encompassing behavior model is tedious to learn and update, and too broad to be effective at detecting subtle anomalies without generating many false alarms.

    “The ever-increasing number of literally thousands of types of IoT devices (ranging from temperature sensors and smart light bulbs to big appliances like washing machines) and the typical scarcity of their communications, makes an all-encompassing behavior model 1) tedious to learn and update, and 2) too broad to be effective at detecting subtle anomalies without generating many false alarms.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Using AuDI, DÏoT can reliably map devices to a corresponding device type and be trained and operated autonomously without human intervention.

    “Using this approach we can reliably map devices to a corresponding device type for which D ÏOT can build a devicetype-specific model of normal behavior that can be used to effectively detect anomalous deviations.This allows D ÏOT to be trained and operated autonomously, without the need for human intervention at any stage.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    AuDI autonomously identifies the type of individual IoT devices in a local network, accurate and fast (30 minutes to identify device type at 98.2% accuracy).

    “For D ÏOT, we selected an existing approach -AuDI [14] that autonomously identifies the type of individual IoT devices in a local network.This approach is accurate and fast (requiring only 30 minutes to identify device type at the accuracy of 98.2 %).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [14]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Federated learning aggregation maximizes usage of limited information from scarce communications at each gateway and improves accuracy by utilizing all available data for learning.

    “This aggregation maximizes the usage of limited information obtained from scarce communications at each gateway (challenge C4) and helps to improve the accuracy of anomaly detection models by utilizing all available data for learning.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Existing intrusion detection techniques are not effective in detecting compromised IoT devices given the massive scale of the problem in terms of the number of different types of devices and manufacturers involved.

    “However, existing intrusion detection techniques are not effective in detecting compromised IoT devices given the massive scale of the problem in terms of the number of different types of devices and manufacturers involved.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Federated learning is suitable for scenarios where data are massively distributed and contributions from clients are imbalanced.

    “Federated learning is chosen because it is suitable [21] for scenarios where: • data are massively distributed, so that there is a large number of clients each having a small amount of data.”
    • Also stated in: § B. Detection Process · plain
      “• contributions from clients are imbalanced.In our system, the training data available at each Security Gateway depends on the duration that an IoT device has been in the network and the amount of interaction it has had, which varies largely between clients.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [21]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    GRU provides similar accuracy as other RNN approaches but is computationally less expensive.

    “GRUs provide similar accuracy as other RNN approaches but are computationally less expensive [17], [18].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [17], [18]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Federated learning is a communication-efficient and privacy-preserving learning approach suited for distributed optimization of Deep Neural Networks.

    “Federated learning is a communication-efficient and privacy-preserving learning approach suited for distributed optimization of Deep Neural Networks (DNN) [19], [20].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [19], [20]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    Mirai is a highly relevant baseline for IoT malware behavior because its source code is publicly available, variants use the same code base, and it realizes similar attack stages as state-of-the-art IoT malware.

    “We selected Mirai for this purpose, since its source code is publicly available and several infamous malware variants like Hajime [2] or Persirai [27] have been implemented using the same code base.Mirai also realizes similar attack stages (detailed in Sect.V-A3 below) as stateof-the-art IoT malware [3], [28].This makes Mirai a highly relevant baseline for IoT malware behavior.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [2] source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [27]

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [3]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Study design and conductown data

    The deployment dataset involved 14 different smart home IoT devices in several domestic deployment scenarios with real users for one week.

    “we installed a number of (n = 14) different smart home IoT devicesfoot_0 in several different domestic deployment scenarios.This deployment involved real users and collected communication traces of these devices under realistic usage conditions.”
    • Also stated in: § 1) Activity dataset: · plain
      “Packet traces were collected continuously during one week.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    IoT devices typically generate little traffic, so only little data can be provided by each client alone.

    “IoT devices typically generate little traffic, which means only little data can be provided by each client alone.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Interpretationown data

    Model needs less than 25 hours of data for FPR=0; with 10 clients each needs 2.5 hours.

    “the model needs less than 25 hours of data to achieve FPR = 0.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    DÏoT starts operating with no anomaly detection model and learns and improves these models as Security Gateways aggregate more data.

    “It is worth noting that D ÏOT starts operating with no anomaly detection model.It learns and improves these models as Security Gateways aggregate more data.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductown data

    The number of devices was limited because the WiFi interface driver allowed at most 16 devices to connect simultaneously.

    “The number of devices was limited, as the driver of the used WiFi interface allowed at most 16 devices to reliably connect to it simultaneously.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    DÏOT does not require any human intervention or labeled data to operate.

    “D ÏOT does not require any human intervention or labeled data to operate.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductown data

    Testing for false positives used four-fold cross-validation for device types in Activity and Deployment datasets.

    “Testing for false positives was performed by four-fold crossvalidation for device types in the Activity and Deployment datasets.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
29 of 29
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    No malicious manufacturers; IoT devices are not compromised when first released by a manufacturer.

    “A1 -No malicious manufacturers.IoT devices may be vulnerable but are not compromised when first released by a manufacturer.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Security Gateway is not compromised.

    “A2 -Security Gateway is not compromised.Since Security Gateway is the device enforcing security in the SOHO network, we assume that it is not compromised.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The adversary is IoT malware performing attacks against, or launching attacks from, vulnerable devices in the SOHO network.

    “Adversary.The adversary is IoT malware performing attacks against, or launching attacks from, vulnerable devices in the SOHO network.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Anomaly detection often suffers from a high false alarm rate, making it unusable in practice.

    “However, this approach often suffers from a high false alarm rate, making it unusable in practice.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Many IoT devices are vulnerable due to insecure design, implementation, and configuration.

    “Many of these devices are, however, vulnerable due to insecure design, implementation, and configuration.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    For initial model training, training data contain only legitimate network traffic, as devices are assumed initially benign.

    “For initial model training, we can assume the training data contain only legitimate network traffic, as devices are assumed initially to be benign (assumption A1 (Sect.II-B)).”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The Security Gateway is not compromised by the adversary.

    “In the scope of this paper we assume that the Security Gateway is not compromised by the adversary (assumption A2 (Sect.II-B)).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Traditional single-model anomaly detection approaches suffer from increasing false positive rates or decreasing sensitivity as the number of device types grows.

    “Traditional anomaly detection approaches utilizing a single model for modeling benign behavior easily suffer from increasing false positive rates or decreasing sensitivity when the number of different types of behaviors (i.e., device types) captured by the model grows.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The behavior of an IoT device type can evolve due to firmware updates, modifying its behavior and potentially triggering false alarms.

    “The behavior of an IoT device type can evolve due to, e.g., firmware updates that bring new functionality.This modifies its behavior and may trigger false alarms for legitimate communication.”
9 of 9

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • The FL-based attack detection scheme in [82] achieves a high detection rate of 95.6% with low learning time compared to centralized learning.

    “Experiments with Mirai malware on a testbed confirm a high detection rate with 95.6% with low learning time, compared to the centralized learning approach at an IoT server.”

    From Federated Learning for Internet of Things: A Comprehensive Survey (2021) · cites this paper as [82]

    The Accuracy section reports a 95.60% Mirai attack-detection rate and an average detection delay of 257 ± 194 ms. The Efficiency of Federated Learning section gives 95.60% for centralized learning and 95.43%, 95.01%, and 94.07% for federated models; it does not establish a lower learning time than centralized learning. The reported delay is time to detect an attack, not time to train the model. (LLM, conf=0.91)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The involvement of a large number of IoT devices enhances learning accuracy for better attack detection efficiency.

    “The involvement of a large number of IoT devices with diverse features and massive datasets enhances the learning accuracy for better attack detection efficiency.”

    From Federated Learning for Internet of Things: A Comprehensive Survey (2021) · cites this paper as [82]

    In “Efficiency of Federated Learning” (page unavailable), the paper reports that more participating clients improved the false-positive rate, but the true-positive rate deteriorated slightly. “Data Needed for Training” reports that more training data reduced false positives. The claim overstates these findings as a general improvement in attack detection from large numbers of diverse IoT devices and massive datasets; the paper instead notes that individual devices generate little data and uses device-type-specific models. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • FL comes as a natural solution to perform attack detection algorithms for distributed IoT networks.

    “To overcome these challenges, FL comes as a natural solution to perform attack detection algorithms for distributed IoT networks [82].”
  • DIoT demonstrates the efficacy of federated learning in detecting a wider range of attack types occurring at multiple devices.

    “where it demonstrates the efficacy of federated learning in detecting a wider range of attack types occurring at multiple devices.”
  • The proposed IDS for industrial cyber physical systems achieves F-score = 98.14%, recall = 97.47%, precision = 98.85%, accuracy = 99.20%, which are better compared to three related works.

    “The performance evaluation under the gas pipeline system dataset show the following results: F-score = 98.14 %, recall = 97.47 %, precision = 98.85 %, accuracy = 99.20 %, which are better compared to three related works [57], [95], and [77]”

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 15

  1. gamblin, 0, Mirai-Source-Code
  2. feng, 0, Acquisitional rule-based engine for discovering internet-of-things devices, 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18), 327
  3. 0, Gated recurrent unit
  4. 0, BrickerBot results in PDoS attack
  5. yeh, 0, Persirai New Internet of Things (IoT) Botnet Targets IP Cameras
  6. doshi, 2018, Machine learning ddos detection for consumer internet of things devices, abs 1804 4159
  7. nguyen, 2018, D&#x00CF;oT A federated self-learning anomaly detection system for IoT
  8. edwards, 2016, Hajime: Analysis of a decentralized internet worm for IoT devices, Rapidity Networks Tech Rep
  9. smith, 2017, Federated multi-task learning, Advances in neural information processing systems, 4427
  10. 0, A micro web framework written in python
  11. 0, Flask socketio client
  12. jardine, 0, Senami: Selective noninvasive active monitoring for ics intrusion detection, Proceedings of the 2Nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy ser CPS-SPC '16, 23
  13. 0, Flask socketio
  14. 0, Keras Deep Learning Library
  15. 0, gevent asynchronous framework

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Nguyen, T. D., Marchal, S., Miettinen, M., Fereidooni, H., Asokan, N., & Sadeghi, A.-R.
Affiliations
  • Technische Universität Darmstadt (DE)
  • Aalto University (FI)
  • Association for Computing Machinery (US)
Venue
2019 IEEE 39th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2019-07
Pages
756-767
OpenAlex
W2903957940
Cited by
663
References
52
Citations by year
2026: 91 · 2025: 100 · 2024: 116 · 2023: 118 · 2022: 94 · 2021: 93 · 2020: 44 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 1
FWCI
51.21
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • TUbilio (Technical University of Darmstadt) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • Cisco Systems
  • Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (CRC1119, CRC1119 CROSSING)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
Keywords
Internet of Things security, compromised device detection, anomaly detection, intrusion detection, federated learning, self-learning systems, Mirai malware, home automation, unlabeled data

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