Security, Privacy, and Safety Aspects of Civilian Drones: A Survey
Abstract
The market for civilian unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones, is expanding rapidly as new applications are emerging to incorporate the use of civilian drones in our daily lives. On one hand, the convenience of offering certain services via drones is attractive. On the other hand, the mere operation of these airborne machines, which rely heavily on their cyber capabilities, poses great threats to people and property. Also, while the Federal Aviation Administration NextGen project aims to integrate civilian drones into the national airspace, the regulation is still a work-in-progress and does not cope with their threats. This article surveys the main security, privacy, and safety aspects associated with the use of civilian drones in the national airspace. In particular, we identify both the physical and cyber threats of such systems and discuss the security properties required by their critical operation environment. We also identify the research challenges and possible future directions in the fields of civilian drone security, safety, and privacy. Based on our investigation, we forecast that security will be a central enabling technology for the next generation of civilian unmanned aerial vehicles.
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Solutions to GPS spoofing include authentication of GPS signals such as checking GPS observables that denote travelling time or detecting sudden changes in signal power/observables.
“Solutions to GPS spoofing include the authentication of GPS signals such as checking GPS observables that denote the travelling time of the signals or detecting sudden changes in signal power/observables which may indicate the start of a spoofing attack [90].”
From A Survey on the Convergence of Edge Computing and AI for UAVs: Opportunities and Challenges (2022) · cites this paper as [90]
UAVs are vulnerable to attacks that target wireless links, cyber elements, physical elements, and interfaces between cyber and physical elements.
“whilst being vulnerable to attacks that target wireless links, cyber elements, physical elements, and interfaces between cyber and physical elements [90].”
From A Survey on the Convergence of Edge Computing and AI for UAVs: Opportunities and Challenges (2022) · cites this paper as [90]
It is both easy for UAVs to violate privacy and difficult to capture UAVs that intrude.
“It is both easy for UAVs to violate privacy and difficult to capture UAVs that intrude [90].”
From A Survey on the Convergence of Edge Computing and AI for UAVs: Opportunities and Challenges (2022) · cites this paper as [90]
Snoopy malicious software can be installed on a UAV for harvesting personal information and tracking/profiling individuals that use smartphones.
“Snoopy malicious software can be installed on a UAV for harvesting personal information and tracking/profiling individuals that use smart phones [90].”
From A Survey on the Convergence of Edge Computing and AI for UAVs: Opportunities and Challenges (2022) · cites this paper as [90]
Cites
Security Tradeoffs in Cyber Physical Systems: A Case Study Survey on Implantable Medical Devices
Altawy, R., & Youssef, A. M. (2016) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2016.2521727 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
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Security analysis of drones systems: Attacks, limitations, and recommendations
Yaacoub, J.-P., Noura, H., Salman, O., & Chehab, A. (2020) · Internet of Things · doi:10.1016/j.iot.2020.100218 · Cited by 727 · see citing works
A Survey on the Convergence of Edge Computing and AI for UAVs: Opportunities and Challenges
McEnroe, P., Wang, S., & Liyanage, M. (2022) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2022.3176400 · Cited by 482 · see citing works
Security and privacy in cyber-physical systems: A survey of surveys
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Defending Airports from UAS: A Survey on Cyber-Attacks and Counter-Drone Sensing Technologies
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Security and privacy issues of UAV: A survey
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- Authors
- Altawy, R., & Youssef, A. M.
- Affiliations
- Concordia University (CA)
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
- Published
- 2016-11-09
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1-25
- ISSN
- 2378-962X (ISSN-L)
- 2378-9638
- OpenAlex
- W2566527471
- Cited by
- 428
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 63 · 2023: 68 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 72 · 2020: 47 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 6
- FWCI
- 25.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Aerospace Engineering › UAV Applications and Optimization
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Aerospace Engineering › Air Traffic Management and Optimization
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cybersecurity and Information Systems
- Keywords
- civil drones, unmanned aerial vehicles, drone security, drone privacy, drone safety, national airspace integration, cyber threats, physical threats, drone regulation, security properties
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