The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
Open accessAbstract
We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants annot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest.As such pxticipants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agents' interests are best served by behaving correctly.Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms.In this model the algorithmic solution is adorned with payments to the participants and is termed a mechanism.The payments should be carefully chosen a6 to motivate all participants to act as the algorithm designer wishes.We apply the standard tools of mechanism design to algorithmic problems and in particular to the shortest path problem.Our main technical contribution concerns the study of a representative problem, task scheduling, for which the standard tools do not suffice.We present several theorems regarding this problem including an approximation me&anism, lower bounds and a randomized mechanism.We also suggest and motivate extensions to the basic model and prove improved upper bounds in the extended model.Many open problems are suggested as well.
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Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
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Self-citationComputationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
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Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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Cited by
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
McSherry, F., & Talwar, K. (2007) · 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07) · doi:10.1109/focs.2007.66 · Cited by 1,371
Towards Sharp Inapproximability For Any 2-CSP
Austrin, P. (2007) · 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07) · doi:10.1109/focs.2007.41 · Cited by 1,294
Algorithms, games, and the internet
Papadimitriou, C. (2001) · Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing · doi:10.1145/380752.380883 · Cited by 1,085
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Lehmann, D., Oćallaghan, L. I., & Shoham, Y. (2002) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/585265.585266 · Cited by 655
Tussle in cyberspace: defining tomorrow's Internet
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Metadata
- Authors
- Nisan, N., & Ronen, A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 1999-05
- Pages
- 129-140
- OpenAlex
- W2039634593
- Cited by
- 476
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 25.30
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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