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Incentives in Teams
Abstract
This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team. Considered is a conglomerate-type organization consisting of a set of semi-autonomous subunits that are coordinated by the organization's head. The head's incentive problem is to choose a set of employee compensation rules that will induce his subunit managers to communicate accurate information and take optimal decisions. The main result exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior. Particular attention is directed to the informational aspects of the problem. An extended example of a resource allocation model is discussed and the optimal incentive structure is interpreted in terms of prices charged by the head for resources allocated to the subunits.
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Citations
Cited by
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(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
Falkinger, J., Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Winter-Ebmer, R. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.247 · Cited by 338
Ba, S., Stallaert, J., & Whinston, A. B. (2001) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.12.3.225.9712 · Cited by 326
Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action
Runge, C. F. (1984) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130438 · Cited by 290
Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment
List, J. A., & Lucking-Reiley, D. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.961 · Cited by 171
Metadata
- Authors
- Groves, T.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1973-07
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 617
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2078040677
- Cited by
- 3,284
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 6.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in Teams. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
