The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract Non-Interference: A Unifying Framework for Weakening Information-flow
Abstract
Non-interference happens when some elements of a dynamic system do not interfere, i.e., do not affect, other elements in the same system. Originally introduced in language-based security, non-interference means that the manipulation of private information has no effect on public observations of data. In this article, we introduce abstract non-interference as a weakening of non-interference by abstract interpretation. Abstract non-interference is parametric on which private information we want to protect and which are the observational capabilities of the external observer, i.e., what the attacker can observe of a computation and of the data manipulated during the computation. This allows us to model a variety of situations in information-flow security, where the security of a system can be mastered by controlling the degree of precision of the strongest harmless attacker and the properties that are potentially leaked in case of successful attack.
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Cites
Cousot, P., & Cousot, R. (1977) · Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN symposium on Principles of programming languages - POPL '77 · doi:10.1145/512950.512973 · Cited by 6,279
Security Policies and Security Models
Goguen, J. A., & Meseguer, J. (1982) · 1982 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.1982.10014 · Cited by 2,119
Language-based information-flow security
Sabelfeld, A., & Myers, A. C. (2003) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2002.806121 · Cited by 1,907
Cited by
Secure Information Flow as a Safety Problem
Terauchi, T., & Aiken, A. (2005) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11547662_24 · Cited by 282
Dimensions and Principles of Declassification
Sabelfeld, A., & Sands, D. (2005) · 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'05) · doi:10.1109/csfw.2005.15 · Cited by 263
Metadata
- Authors
- Giacobazzi, R., & Mastroeni, I.
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
- Published
- 2018-02-05
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1-31
- ISSN
- 2471-2566 (ISSN-L)
- 2471-2574
- OpenAlex
- W2129211121
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 3
- Type
- conference abstract
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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