The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Transforming out timing leaks
Open accessAbstract
One aspect of security in mobile code is privacy: private (or secret) data should not be leaked to unauthorised agents. Most of the work on secure information flow has until recently only been concerned with detecting direct and indirect flows. Secret information can however be leaked to the attacker also through covert channels. It is very reasonable to assume that the attacker, even as an external observer, can monitor the timing (including termination) behaviour of the program. Thus to claim a program secure, the security analysis must take also these into account.
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Citations
Cites
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
Kocher, P. C. (1996) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9 · Cited by 4,387
Security Policies and Security Models
Goguen, J. A., & Meseguer, J. (1982) · 1982 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.1982.10014 · Cited by 2,119
A lattice model of secure information flow
Denning, D. E. (1976) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/360051.360056 · Cited by 1,907
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
Myers, A. C. (1999) · Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/292540.292561 · Cited by 1,034
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Denning, D. E., & Denning, P. J. (1977) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359636.359712 · Cited by 1,029
A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Volpano, D., Irvine, C., & Smith, G. (1996) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-1996-42-304 · Cited by 969
The SLam calculus: programming with secrecy and integrity
Heintze, N., & Riecke, J. G. (1998) · Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages - POPL '98 · doi:10.1145/268946.268976 · Cited by 410
Secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language
Smith, G., & Volpano, D. (1998) · Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages - POPL '98 · doi:10.1145/268946.268975 · Cited by 406
Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs
Sabelfeld, A., & Sands, D. (2002) · Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 · doi:10.1109/csfw.2000.856937 · Cited by 304
A type-based approach to program security
Volpano, D., & Smith, G. (1997) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/bfb0030629 · Cited by 225
Cited by
Language-based information-flow security
Sabelfeld, A., & Myers, A. C. (2003) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2002.806121 · Cited by 1,907
ObliVM: A Programming Framework for Secure Computation
Liu, C., Wang, X. S., Nayak, K., Huang, Y., & Shi, E. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.29 · Cited by 307
Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs
Sabelfeld, A., & Sands, D. (2002) · Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 · doi:10.1109/csfw.2000.856937 · Cited by 304
Metadata
- Authors
- Agat, J.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2000-01-05
- Pages
- 40-53
- OpenAlex
- W1997775274
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 7.89
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.